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Malicious domains host Command and Control servers that are used to instruct in-
fected machines to perpetuate malicious activities such as sending spam, stealing creden-
tials, and launching denial of service attacks. Both static and dynamic analysis of malware
as well as monitoring Domain Name System (DNS) trafﬁc provide valuable insight into
such malicious activities and help security experts detect and protect against many cyber
attacks.
Advanced crimeware toolkits were responsible for many recent cyber attacks. In
order to understand the inner workings of such toolkits, we present a detailed reverse en-
gineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit to unveil its underlying architecture and
enable its mitigation. Our analysis allows us to provide a breakdown for the structure of the
Zeus botnet network messages.
In the second part of this work, we develop a framework for analyzing dynamic anal-
ysis reports of malware samples. This framework can be used to extract valuable cyber in-
telligence from the analyzed malware. The obtained intelligence helps reveal more insight
into different cyber attacks and uncovers abused domains as well as malicious infrastruc-
ture networks. Based on this framework, we develop a severity ranking system for domain
names. The system leverages the interaction between domain names and malware samples
to extract indicators for malicious behaviors or abuse actions. The system utilizes these
behavioral features on a daily basis to produce severity or abuse scores for domain names.
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Since our system assigns maliciousness scores that describe the level of abuse for each
analyzed domain name, it can be considered as a complementary component to existing
(binary) reputation systems, which produce long lists with no priorities.
We also developed a severity system for name servers based on passive DNS trafﬁc.
The system leverages the domain names that reside under the authority of name servers to
extract indicators for malicious behaviors or abuse actions. It also utilizes these behavioral
features on a daily basis to dynamically produce severity or abuse scores for name servers.
Finally, we present a system to characterize and detect the payload distribution chan-
nels within passive DNS trafﬁc. Our system observes the DNS zone activities of access
counts of each resource record type and determines payload distribution channels. Our
experiments on near real-time passive DNS trafﬁc demonstrate that our system can detect
several resilient malicious payload distribution channels.
iv
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Malicious networks are increasingly abusing Internet infrastructure to perform illicit activ-
ities. Recent studies [2] indicate that botnets are the primary platform through which cyber
criminals create global cooperative networks that are instrumental in most cyber criminal
attacks. A bot is a software robot or a malware instance that runs automatically on a com-
promised machine without being noticed by the victim user. The bot code is often written
by skilled programmers and usually supports several kinds of malicious functionalities [3]
that are instrumental in a variety of attacks and malicious activities. The term botnet, de-
rived from the word bot, is a network of bots that are controlled by an attacker called a
botmaster or botherder. A botnet is generally considered as a generic platform for online
criminal attacks which affect the Internet economy [4].
The alarming increase in the power of botnets and their infectious effects have turned
botnets into one of the biggest threats to Internet security [5]. Currently, botnets are con-
sidered as the main cause of most Internet attacks and malicious activities. Although the
existence of botnets has been noticed for a long time, it is the recent growth of cyber crimes,
which are mediated by botnets, that has attracted the attention of IT security researchers.
Botnets are normally used to distribute malware and other harmful software. According
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to a recent report [6], one botnet illegally installed adware on hundreds of thousands of
computers in the U.S., including some belonging to the military.
Most of the botnets are designed to steal sensitive information (e.g., identities, credit
card numbers, passwords, or product keys) from a victim’s local machine. This can be
achieved by employing keyloggers and screen capturing utilities. In 2013, the FBI reported
that 10 members of an international cyber crime ring were arrested for using botnets to steal
more than $850 million after obtaining personal ﬁnancial information from compromised
computers [7].
Advanced crimeware toolkits were responsible for many recent cyber attacks. These
crimeware toolkits were behind more than 60% of the malicious domains as reported by
Symantec [8]. In order to understand the inner workings of such toolkits, we present a
detailed reverse engineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit to unveil its underlying
architecture and enable its mitigation. Our analysis allows us to provide a breakdown for
the structure of the Zeus botnet network messages.
In addition to analyzing malware samples, monitoring the Domain Name System
(DNS) trafﬁc also provides valuable insight into such malicious activities and helps security
experts detect and protect against many cyber attacks. Since the DNS is a core component
of Internet activities, it has been increasingly abused by malicious networks to operate
different activities. For instance, malicious domains host Command and Control (C&C)
servers that are used to instruct infected machines to perpetrate malicious activities, such
as sending spam, stealing credentials, and launching Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks. Moreover, malicious domains may serve as repositories of stolen credentials [9],
hacked software [10], and attack payloads [11].
In this thesis, we study the problem of DNS abuse by utilizing malware analysis and


























Figure 1.1: Overview of the thesis components.
cyber crime attacks and provide insightful intelligence, recommendations, and malicious-
ness indicators. As depicted in Figure 1.1, the analysis of DNS abuse starts by building a
framework that extracts insights into malicious networks from the dynamic malware analy-
sis reports. This framework can help investigators to collect preliminary information about
different cyber attack incidents and then guide them in shaping the investigation process.
A typical investigation starts by collecting simple statistics such as active malware families
and most abused Internet Service Providers (ISPs). In addition, an investigator may be in-
terested in discovering the structure of the suspicious networks, which can be achieved by
our framework by applying network analysis techniques. Furthermore, our framework pro-
vides geolocation information about compromised machines in order to gain deeper insight
into targeted attacks.
DNS abuse incidents are increasing dramatically as reported by Architelos (see Fig-
ure 1.2) [1]. Security professionals adopt domain name blacklisting, which is regarded as
one of the basic defense lines against DNS abuses. However, domain blacklists are growing
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progressively limited and ineffective in ﬁghting the ever increasing number of malicious do-
main names appearing every day. To overcome this problem, blacklisting approaches must
provide more information about each blacklisted domain in order to facilitate and prioritize
the investigation process. Blacklisting can be extended to include detailed maliciousness
indicators to focus on speciﬁc types of attacks while dealing with cyber attacks. To achieve
this in our thesis, we apply a statistical reputation system to generate severity scores for
domain names.
Figure 1.2: Domain abuse monitoring based on major blacklists and security services from
November 2013 to February 2014 [1].
Name servers play an important role in the DNS infrastructure to provide the neces-
sary information about domain names. In recent times, authoritative name servers have been
abused to amplify DDoS attacks toward different victims [12]. Moreover, cyber criminals
host their malicious domains on bulletproof name servers equipped with various techniques,
which impede takedown operations [13]. In fact, the abuse of name servers has increased
by advanced techniques requiring the control over name servers. To tackle this problem,
reputation systems can be built around name servers to ﬁght the root cause of malicious
domains and minimize their hosting power. On the other hand, name servers have been
abused to distribute malicious payload to compromised machines. Malware families such
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as Morto [14], Katusha [15], and Feederbot [16] have been identiﬁed as using the DNS pro-
tocol to hide their communications. As a countermeasure, we propose a solution to identify
the malicious name servers that serve payload distribution domains.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 presents the motivation
and problem statement. Section 1.2 lists the contributions of the thesis. The structure of the
thesis is given in Section 1.3.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Description
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the motivations of the current study and identify the
challenges faced by the security community in analyzing malicious networks.
1.1.1 Intelligence Extraction
One of the basic defense lines against cyber attacks is analyzing malware binary samples
statically and/or dynamically to understand their behavior and thence develop detection
mechanisms. However, the tremendous number of malware variants for the same malware
family is severely affecting the utilization of the extracted information from the analysis.
For example, Mcafee reported more than 100,000 new malware samples every day in the
year of 2012 [17]. Since the number of malware samples is rapidly growing, the dynamic
analysis reports produce huge amounts of valuable information that need to be utilized
effectively for further analysis.
1.1.2 DNS Reputation
Domain name blacklisting is one of the basic defense lines against DNS abuses. Throughout
past years, several improvements were introduced to blacklisting in order to overcome some
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of the weaknesses in responsiveness and completeness [18]. Blacklists suffer from high
false negative rates and false positive rates [19]. Furthermore, cyber criminals are utilizing
the power of their zombie machines to operate short-lived domains, which dramatically
increase the size of blacklists. For instance, the Conﬁker.C malware family used about
50,000 domains per day [20]. This behavior overwhelms takedown operations with a large
number of malicious domain names.
In addition, DNS has been abused by cyber criminals with techniques that require
more control over name servers to be implemented effectively. Cyber criminals have begun
to use agile behaviors that result in a tremendous number of short-lived domains, which
are used for malicious purposes for a certain period and then disposed. For example, some
botnets (e.g., Torbig [21], Karken [22]) employed Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA)
to periodically create and register domain names that point to the botnet infrastructure.
On the other hand, malicious networks usually operate on compromised machines, which
suffer from availability problems. Consequently, botmasters adopted the load balancing
technique, known as Fast-Flux [23], in utilizing these compromised machines for malicious
activities. Such behaviors usually rely upon frequent updates on the authoritative name
servers, which are responsible for managing the malicious domains. Despite the fact that
DNS abuse has been known for a long time, it remains as one of the greatest challenges in
ﬁghting cyber crime.
1.1.3 Payload Distribution Channels
A common approach to bypass network defense borders involves tunneling the communica-
tion through existing protocols. Such tunneling can effectively defeat traditional ﬁrewalls
and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Malicious network operators (botmasters) often
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prefer tunneling to keep their communications under the radar. In the early stages of bot-
nets, botmasters mostly used Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels (e.g., Agobot) to operate
and control their activities. The advancement of newer protocols such as Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP), Peer-to-Peer (P2P), and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) has rendered
the use of IRC channels obsolete [15]; see e.g., Zeus [24] (HTTP-based), Storm [25] (P2P-
based). As a natural extension to exploiting common protocols for tunneling, DNS comes
into play due to its wide availability. DNS is a query-response protocol, which responds
to each query with the corresponding pre-deﬁned resource record. The simple but robust
architecture of DNS at times attracts botnets to abuse the system for different malicious ac-
tivities [26, 27, 28, 16]. Botmasters take advantage of DNS tunneling to conduct malicious
activities such as C&C or payload distribution. For example, in payload distribution chan-
nels, botmasters use DNS query and response packets to carry out malicious instructions
and payload updates to individual bots. Malware families such as Morto [14], Katusha [15],
and Feederbot [16] have recently been identiﬁed as using the DNS protocol to hide their
communications.
Compared to other protocols, the inherent nature of DNS renders the protocol quite
inefﬁcient as a payload distribution channel [29]. On the other hand, DNS is widely avail-
able, which explains the recent exploitation of DNS as an attack channel despite the narrow
transmission bandwidth. However, in comparison to P2P botnets [25], DNS abuse by mal-
ware has not been comprehensively studied thus far, and previous work on DNS abuse
mainly focused on speciﬁc malware families (e.g., [16]).
1.1.4 Objectives
Our main objective is to generate timely, relevant and actionable cyber threat intelligence.
This can be achieved by:
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• Understanding most prominent threats to extend the knowledge about malware inner
workings, behaviors and enabling techniques and technologies.
• Deriving cyber threat intelligence from malware analysis to reveal more insights
about different cyber attacks.
• Analyzing the severity of domain names and name servers to overcome problems as-
sociated with traditional blacklisting approaches, one must provide more information
about each blacklisted domain in order to facilitate and prioritize the investigation
process.
• Investigating the malicious use of DNS to transport payload.
1.2 Contributions
We have developed a set of methods to address the objectives mentioned above. Our con-
tributions can be summarized as follows:
Reverse engineering of one of the most prominent crimeware toolkits: We analyze one
of the famous crimeware toolkits by reverse engineering techniques. More precisely, we
present a detailed reverse engineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit to unveil its
secrets and enable its mitigation.
Design and implementation of a framework to investigate abused domains and mali-
cious infrastructure networks: We propose a framework that extracts intelligence from
the dynamic malware analysis reports. We design and implement our framework based on
a live daily feed of dynamic malware analysis reports, which contains an average of 6000
reports per day. Our framework has been used to investigate the abused domains as well as
the malicious infrastructure network [30].
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Design and implementation of a dynamic severity system that ranks domain names:
We propose a dynamic severity system that ranks domain names by observing malware
behavioral features in a controlled environment, which reveals the level of abuse of the
observed domains by malware samples. The obtained behavioral features help to uncover
malicious domains and assign dynamic severity scores to them. We design and implement
a proof-of-concept for our system and evaluate it using a 10-month malware dataset, where
we analyzed more than 14 million malware reports. This extensive real-world evaluation
conﬁrms that our system can assign a high severity score to malicious domain names.
Design and implementation of a dynamic severity system that ranks name servers:
In general, malicious networks tend to reuse their resources, such as source code [31] and
network infrastructure [32], to launch different attacks. When an important element of a
malicious network, such as name server, has been taken down, the activities of that speciﬁc
network is negatively affected. We propose a dynamic reputation system that ranks the
severity of name servers. Some statistical features help to uncover malicious domains and
then assign dynamic reputation scores for the observed name servers. We extend the domain
name reputation system to observe domain features from DNS trafﬁc that reveal various
types of abuse.
Investigation of payload distribution channels in DNS trafﬁc: In order to investigate the
abuse of DNS for payload distribution, we present a comprehensive analysis of malicious
payload distribution channels using a 1-year malware dataset covering Jan.-Dec. 2012.
Our study reveals the effectiveness of distributing payload over DNS by malware instances.
In addition, we also introduce a detection solution for payload distribution channels using
passive DNS trafﬁc by utilizing the access counts of resource records. The evaluation of
the proposed method was conducted on near real-time passive DNS trafﬁc over a 30-day
period provided by Farsight Security Inc. [33].
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The work in this thesis was published in [34, 35, 36]. In addition, other work, which
was executed during this PhD, but not included in the thesis, appeared in [37, 38, 39, 40, 30].
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the
necessary knowledge required throughout our work. In addition, it provides a discussion
on the current literature about the subjects that are related to the problems addressed in
this thesis. Chapter 3 describes a detailed reverse engineering analysis of the Zeus crime-
ware toolkit. Chapter 4 proposes the intelligence extraction framework built based on the
dynamic malware reports. Chapter 5 introduces a new severity system for domain names
that produce domain ranking scores. Chapter 6 deﬁnes the payload distribution detection
mechanism. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and identiﬁes directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Background
In this section, we review some of the required concepts that are used throughout our thesis.
This section is organized as follows. Section 2.1.1 reviews the basic information about
botnets, while Section 2.1.2 provides the required knowledge about DNS. Section 2.1.3
presents details about reputation systems.
2.1.1 Botnet Overview
A bot typically uses a combination of existing advanced malware victimizing. For example,
a bot can use keylogger and rootkit techniques. Analogous to worms, a bot has the potential
capability of increasing its size and propagating over the Internet. It can also spread by
employing existing social engineering techniques and systems, such as instant messaging
and email communication systems. Bots have recently adopted phishing techniques to trick
victims into downloading speciﬁed malware [41]. As a result of these multiple propagation
vectors, the attacker obtains control over many victim machines within a short time span.
The regular size of most botnets currently ranges from tens to hundreds of thousands of bots,
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including exceptionally large botnets comprised of several millions of bots [42]. Compared
to other intrusion systems, botnets are distinct in two ways: ﬁrst, bots are goal-directed,
with the purpose of most attacks (such as spamming and DDoS attacks) focusing on the
gain of ﬁnancial proﬁts [43]; second, the botmaster (the owner of botnet) can interact with
his/her bots via C&C servers.
Botnet Life Cycle
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the life cycle of a typical botnet begins with an ordinary per-
sonal computer that is initially infected by certain propagation vectors. The infected system
ﬁrst launches malicious activities locally, followed by attempts to communicate with the
botnet infrastructure. From the botnet infrastructure, the infected machine will have an op-
portunity to update itself with the latest malware binaries. The acquired binaries instruct
the infected system to communicate with the rest of the botnet infrastructure in addition to
other modules. In general, the infected system is directed to download the updates through
a variety of protocols used for ﬁle transfer such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and HTTP.
At a speciﬁc point in time, the botmaster tries to instruct its botnet infrastructure (C&C)
with all the necessary information to launch an attack. After a successful attack, the botnet
may lose some of its systems due to the presence of detection and mitigation systems inside
the networks. To ﬁll the gap, the botnet attempts to recruit more systems to be used in future
attacks.
Bot Propagation and Infection Techniques
To avoid being detected by various deployed detection systems, bots are designed in a
speciﬁc way that enables them to change their propagation mechanisms over time. For
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Figure 2.1: Botnet life cycle.
running exploitable services. These exploitable services allow the previous infected hosts
to inject a small amount of shellcode into the victim machine. Unlike worms, botnets are
difﬁcult to be classiﬁed on the mere basis of their scanning techniques. Botnets are adopting
such behaviors, and the existence of a human controller (botmaster) allows them to cause
more targeted attacks while maintaining a high level of stealth.
With the development of more sophisticated protection and detection techniques, the
method of botnet attacks is now more similar to that of a Trojan horse. Trojans trick victims
into installing malware under the false belief that the malware is useful and beneﬁcial soft-
ware. Similarly, bot infection spreads by transmitting binaries as email attachments. Once
received, the naive user may open malware executables and thus become infected. These
infection scenarios are comparatively less alarming, as they require some action on the part
of a user for the completion of the infection cycle. Another effective infection technique,
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known as web drive-by downloads, involves the user visiting a web site that can exploit
targeted web browsers and thus infect the user’s system. In addition, P2P ﬁle sharing tech-
nologies are successfully exploited by botmasters to distribute malware binaries.
Botnet C&C Architecture
Every new generation of bots introduces itself by exploring different C&C techniques
through which bots can be updated and directed by the botmaster, who can use different
kinds of C&C mechanisms in terms of communication protocols and network structures. A
good choice for attackers would be to employ the IRC protocol, which is now widely used.
HTTP would be another good choice, as it hinders the detection process since HTTP trafﬁc
is for the most part allowed in network policies. More advanced botnets do not rely on
centralized C&C mechanisms and are instead using distributed control techniques to avoid
the single point of failure problem, such as the usage of peer-to-peer networks to organize
and control botnets more consistently [44, 25, 45, 46].
Botnet Reverse Engineering
Reverse Code Engineering (RCE) is the process of analyzing the disassembly of an exe-
cutable with the purpose of recreating the actual source code, or a pseudo-code represen-
tation of the executable’s behavior. The RCE can disclose every decision taken as well as
every algorithm used in a program, but the process can be very time consuming. Com-
pilation of an executable will strip most of the meaningful information from comments,
variable names, and so forth. Furthermore, the use of optimization by compilers will also
diffuse the structure of the disassembly compared to the source code. For this reason, RCE
is often used as an addition to the behavioral analysis by investigating only the interesting
sections of the disassembly. These sections can be found, for example, by looking for the
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use of strings appearing in the bot’s network communication or by ﬁnding sections where
Application Programming Interface (API) calls are made behind some interesting behavior.
Debugging software is the process of running the code with a debugger attached, per-
mitting the use of breakpoints and variable inspection at any point in the code. Debugging
is a very helpful addition to inspect the disassembly. It provides good clues to implementa-
tions of functions, if the actual input and output to the functions are traced.
2.1.2 The Domain Name System
The DNS protocol is designed to play as a translation service for the Internet infrastructure.
The protocol receives a query for a speciﬁc Resource Record (RR), which describes the
characteristics of a domain, and then responds with the corresponding answer based on a
zone ﬁle. A zone ﬁle deﬁnes the services running under a particular domain. A domain
name usually has multiple resource records dedicated for different purposes. These records
consist of ﬁve main components: name, class, type, time-to-live (TTL), and data. The
resource record name is a Fully Qualiﬁed Domain Name (FQDN) that consists of several
labels. The right-most label is the top-level domain, and each label represents a level within
the DNS hierarchy. The label that comes after the top-level domain represents the second-
level domain, unless it is used as a sub-zone of a top-level domain, e.g., co.uk. Any label
that comes after the second-level domain is considered as a sub-domain of the second-level
domain. These sub-domains are deﬁned and mapped to the corresponding resource record
in the zone ﬁle. In some cases, a wildcard can be used to return the same resource record
for any sub-domain [47]. A sub-domain can be set up to have its own zone ﬁle with a
dedicated name server. In this case, the name server of the second-level domain delegates
queries to the name server of the sub-domain. This technique is called zone delegation
and is often used for easing the management of different sub-zones under a domain [48].
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The length of a resource record name cannot exceed 256 bytes and each label length is
limited to 63 bytes [49]. The resource record class deﬁnes name spaces that are used for
different purposes within the DNS protocol. The resource record type indicates the type
of information carried by the DNS message. In Table 2.1, we list some of the resource
record types used in our work. The TTL value is a time period used by DNS servers to
determine how long to cache the response before discarding it. The resource record data is
the response information assigned to a resource record name.
The main actors within the DNS system architecture are the Name Servers (NSs).
These servers are authorized to provide information about a set of domain names. Each
server is aware of other name servers according to the hierarchy of DNS. The right-most
label of any query corresponds to the top-level domain within the hierarchy. Therefore,
when a query is made, the ﬁrst query goes to one of the root name servers, which returns
the address of the name server of the top-level domain. The query traverses the hierarchy
until it reaches the name server of the second-level domain to receive the requested resource
record.
Resource Record (RR) type Description
Address record (A)/ IPv6 address record (AAAA) IPv4/IPv6 address
Name Server (NS) record Authoritative name server
Mail Exchange (MX) record Mail server
Text (TXT) record Text information associated with a
name
Canonical Name (CNAME) record Canonical name or an alias name
Table 2.1: Examples of DNS resource records investigated throughout the thesis.
Passive DNS
Passive DNS is a technique that replicates DNS activities in order to investigate the DNS
trafﬁc in near real-time. The inconsistency between Address record (A) and Pointer record
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(PTR) [50], which is caused by dynamic IP addresses, requires a technique to track changes
to resource records. Therefore, passive DNS is introduced to establish a real-time replica-
tion mechanism [50]. It is designed to be deployed on a local DNS resolver to observe the
DNS trafﬁc. For instance, this historical database is used to retrieve reversed queries about
domain names to gain intelligence information.
Payload Distribution via DNS Hierarchy
In this section, we outline key differences between DNS tunneling and payload distribution
channels. We then discuss the use of these channels both for legitimate and malicious
purposes.
Recently, DNS became a target to distribute malicious payloads for two main reasons.
First, DNS trafﬁc is often allowed to pass through corporate networks without inspection, as
it is considered to be a core element of Internet activities. Second, DNS protocol contains
certain ﬁelds that are deﬁned to be more ﬂexible, which opens the doors for other unin-
tended uses. Malicious payload can be stored in different resource records (e.g., NULL,
TXT, or CNAME). Distributed data can be managed by TTL record for caching purposes.
In addition, the labels within the resource record name can be used to store Base32 en-
coded data. RFC 1464 paved the way for payload distribution by opening the possibility
of storing arbitrary information within DNS messages [51]. However, it recommends stor-
ing key-value pairs to pass only some operational data between servers. The feasibility of
using DNS resource records to distribute payload has been proven by the DNS tunneling
technique, which shows that DNS can be used for transmitting any type of information af-
ter simple encoding operations. However, attackers face some limitations due to the low
data transmission rate through resource records. In general, payload distribution channels
operate similarly to the DNS tunneling technique [29].
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Payload distribution through DNS is a relatively new concept and has a very limited
number of legitimate uses. Some organizations have been inspired by the evolution of DNS
tunneling, and have begun to use DNS as a means to channel part of their operational data
to enhance their systems.
Legitimate Use Cases: In 2007, Trend-Micro Inc. proposed a method to distribute mali-
cious code signature updates through the DNS protocol [52]. The intention of this technique
is to feed Anti-Virus (AV) software clients with signature updates through DNS as an al-
ternative update mechanism. The signature updates are divided into several chunks, which
can be identiﬁed by an identiﬁer number. These pieces are encoded with Base64 and as-
signed to the zone ﬁle as TXT resource records of a speciﬁc domain name. When the client
requires an update of a malicious code signature, it sends a query with an identiﬁer num-
ber of the signature as the FQDN label. The server then responds with the corresponding
AV signature in TXT records. In general, each signature update can span over many TXT
records, which makes the client generate many queries to retrieve all the pieces necessary
to complete the whole update. Finally, the client combines all TXT records and then forms
the actual update of the malicious code signature.
In 2009, Devicescape Software Inc. introduced a methodology of a public hotspot
authentication system for mobile devices [53]. In their model, there are sets of public
WiFi hotspots placed across various locations, such as coffee shops and restaurants. The
authentication system for these hotspots is managed through a centralized scheme. The
DNS protocol is used as a channel to transfer authentication parameters between mobile
devices and a credential server. The client prepares a DNS query, which consists of six sub-
domain labels to carry different parameters, e.g., the Media Access Control (MAC) address
of the client’s machine. When the name server receives the query, it forwards the parameters
embedded in these labels to the back-end credential server. Based on the parameters, the
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credential server prepares the corresponding credentials to be transported back to the client.
Finally, the client veriﬁes the response and then submits it to the authentication server in
the local hotspot network.
Malicious Use Cases: The crucial component of any malicious network is the control and
communication method within the network. DNS has been used by malicious networks for
updating clients with recent payload data (i.e., module updates, command instruction). In
2011, Dietrich et al. [16] reverse engineered the Feederbot botnet that uses DNS as a C&C
channel. Another example of abuse of the DNS protocol is the Morto worm [14] that uses
DNS TXT records to transmit a single piece of information that can ﬁt in one packet to the
client bot. The embedded information is a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that points to
the real attack payload as explained by Symantec [14].
2.1.3 Reputation Systems
In information retrieval, reputation is a type of collective measure for satisfaction based on
member ratings in a given community. Reputation is considered a soft security mechanism
that has been integrated successfully in many applications [54]. There are many reputation
models proposed in the literature to address issues such as trust, quality of service, and se-
curity [55]. The main components of any reputation system are participants, rating centers,
and reputation engine. Since ratings are the basic input for reputation systems, the col-
lection of ratings from participants depends on the nature of the application. For instance,
centralized applications require dedicated rating centers to collect ratings to be used by the
reputation engine. On the other hand, distributed applications require the ratings to be kept
by participants and each individual responsible for deriving any reputation score.
Reputation engines are the main component of integrating the rating values to reﬂect
the participants’ opinions. Based on the format of rating values, reputation engines can
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vary from one to another. For example, a user’s preference can be represented in either
binary or multinomial format. The binary format reﬂects the amount of negative and pos-
itive opinions, while the multinomial format provides more descriptive information about
the opinions. There are many models proposed in the literature to address different require-
ments as discussed in [55]. The model used throughout our work is based on the Bayesian
system, which computes the reputation scores by statistical update of Dirichlet multinomial
probability density functions (PDF) [56]. The Dirichlet system adopts ﬂexible multinomial
rating possibilities, which enable the participant to reﬂect detailed subjective opinions.
Reputation System Evaluation
In order to measure the effectiveness of any reputation system, we must evaluate the result-
ing scores against known judgments from public or third party knowledge. Effectiveness
measures differ based on the results of the evaluated reputation system, which can be or-
dered or unordered sets. In our case, there is a ranked set of objects which are ordered
based on the opinions of the participants. Another parameter to choose the right measure is
the nature of the public judgments used in the evaluation. Public knowledge can be repre-
sented as binary (e.g., Good or Bad) or graded notion. The graded notion is normally used
to quantify the level of importance among the other rated objects. In general, one proper
evaluation measure that can be used to measure the effectiveness of graded notion is the
Discounted Cumulative Gain (DCG) [57]. The DCG accumulates the gain starting at the
top of a ranked list of length n and then discounts the gain at lower ranks. More precisely,








where rank j is the graded ranking level of an object at rank j, and log2 j is a reduction
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factor for the gain. The DCG is normalized (nDCG) by the ideal DCG value, which reﬂects





where DCGs and DCGr denote the DCG values for the evaluated system and the
reference knowledge, respectively. When there is a large number of objects to evaluate, it
is more practical to evaluate the quality of the top ranked list, which holds the important
objects among the others. The nDCG truncated at kth position is denoted as nDCG@k.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we present a review of state-of-the-art techniques developed in the areas of
detection and mitigation of different types of DNS abuse.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 2.2.1, we discuss some previous
works in the area of reverse engineering. Section 2.2.2 reviews the latest works that explore
malicious infrastructures. Section 2.2.3 presents the efforts to ﬁght different DNS abuses. In
Section 2.2.4, we give an overview of the related works in analyzing the payload distribution
through DNS.
2.2.1 Botnet Reverse Engineering
Bot reverse engineering can be considered as one of the primary factors that feed the learn-
ing curve about the underground community. Valuable information can be obtained by
analyzing malware binaries, network traces, and infected system behavior. In the botnet
literature, researchers provided case studies of famous botnet variants. Their studies aimed
to gain knowledge about botnet behaviors and develop some methods to evade them. There
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are three main categories of botnets based on their C&C architecture: IRC, HTTP, and P2P.
For IRC botnets, [3] evaluated four different instances of IRC botnets. This comprehen-
sive study reveals a great deal of knowledge about botnet capabilities in controlling the
infected system, C&C, propagation, attacks, updates delivery, obfuscation, and deception
mechanisms. Throughout their work, they determine possible infection interactions of IRC
botnets and their command strings.
With the rise of HTTP botnets, researchers studied a few instances to understand
the inner details of these new botnet behaviors. Nazario [58] introduced one of the ﬁrst
HTTP botnet analysis studies about BlackEnergy, which is known as a web-based bot tool.
This analysis provided the research community with complete information about the bot-
net architecture, commands, and communication patterns. Like any web-based bot tool,
there was a PHP based C&C which collects statistics about the botnet, and the bot binaries
were built by a customizable malware builder program. The main threat behind this botnet
was DDoS, but no signiﬁcant attacks have been noticed. Another analysis was presented
by Chiang and Lloyd [59] for Rustock rootkit, which contains a spam bot module. They no-
ticed from the network traces that the communication was encrypted by the RC4 algorithm,
which makes it difﬁcult to be detected by detection systems. Moreover, the rootkits and
the multiple levels of obfuscation further complicated the detection process by traditional
AV systems. Generally, this rootkit was used mainly for spamming purposes, which can
be updated through C&C servers. In their analysis, they were able to extract the encryp-
tion key of the C&C communication patterns. HTTP-based botnets were recently involved
in many click frauds. One of the famous botnets responsible for click fraud attacks is the
Clickbot.A. Daswani and Stoppelman [60] presented a detailed case study about clickbot.A
which reveals new techniques for click fraud activities. Their analysis uncovered the main
components of this botnet and their management techniques, commands, and conﬁguration.
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Botnet herders clearly realized the challenges to hide their existence with centralized
control approaches. As a consequence, they shifted to decentralized techniques, P2P com-
munication protocol, which provided them with huge scalability and led them to become
more resilient against traditional detection and tracking techniques. Recent contributions
aim to understand and analyze the existing P2P based botnet instances. For example, Porras
et al. [61] reverse engineered the Storm botnet variant to uncover its capabilities to control
bots and hide binary distribution as well as its obfuscation techniques. From their analysis,
the Storm botnet manages its C&C communication by the Overnet protocol with various
customized communication patterns. Generally, the Storm botnet is used for sending spam
and has capabilities for DDoS attacks. From another perspective, Holz et al. [25] and Griz-
zard et al. [44] reported on the Storm botnet by exploring the encryption key generation
algorithm that is used by each Storm variant to establish secure communication with other
peers in the botnet.
Another example of P2P-based botnets is Nugache [62], which controls its army by
a customized P2P protocol architecture. Dittrich and Dietrich [63] reported information
about their analysis for the Nugache instance. They analyzed the communication patterns,
which involved the key exchange process (Rijndael algorithm) to encrypt the C&C com-
munications. Using an encrypted P2P network, the botherder instructs the botnet to listen
to a speciﬁc IRC channel for DDoS commands. Nugache was later updated to use P2P net-
works for all its communications. Again, Dittrich and Dietrich [64] addressed extra aspects
of analysis and investigated the size estimation of the Nugache botnet using a customized
bot client crawler.
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2.2.2 Malicious Infrastructure Analysis
Within an interactive community, there are many relationships that can be leveraged to
gain insightful knowledge about the nature of the community. Malicious network com-
munities have been explored from different perspectives. For instance, criminal network
infrastructures can be discovered by monitoring the DNS trafﬁc, spam emails, or URLs. Re-
cently, Konte et al. [65] investigated the use of dynamic changes for Fast-Flux networks and
their role to characterize the hosting infrastructure for different online scam campaigns. Na-
garaja et al. [66] extracted P2P botnet communities from network traces by modeling the
interaction information between peers as a communication graph. Invernizzi et al. [67] pro-
posed an approach to identify malicious download attempts in large-scale networks. The
suspicious downloads that exhibit similar behavior aggregated to construct different mali-
cious neighborhood graphs, which can be used to recognize various malware distribution
infrastructures. Nadji et al. [68] constructed criminal networks by correlating the passive
DNS and several indicators for malicious activities. Using a graph-based approach, they
identify criminal communities and study their structural properties. They identiﬁed the
critical nodes to take down the network by utilizing the eigenvector centrality.
In addition to exploring the relation between domain names and IP addresses to un-
cover malicious infrastructures, our work differs from previous works by investigating the
interaction between malware samples and domain names to understand the level of mali-
cious abuse.
2.2.3 DNS Reputation
Domain name blacklisting is one of the oldest and most effective techniques to ﬁght cyber
criminal activities and track the abuse of DNS. Most of the current blacklisting services
are based on two approaches to collect malicious IP addresses or domain names. The ﬁrst
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approach is based on collecting IP addresses and domain names from complaints or abuse
reports by victims [69]. The other approach utilizes the behavioral analysis of DNS trafﬁc
based on ﬁnding evidence of malicious activities [70, 71, 72].
Dietrich and Rossow [73] studied the effectiveness of various IP blacklists and re-
ported the need for dynamic blacklisting for optimization purposes. Zhang et al. [74] in-
troduced dynamic domain blacklisting by cross-correlating DShield [75] attack log ﬁles
from different providers. They build relevant IP blacklists for each data provider as well as
attack severity scores based on frequencies of accessing pre-deﬁned ports. The relevance
concept has been improved by Soldo et al. [76] using recommendation systems to predict
attack sources. As a proactive solution, Felegyhazi et al. [77] use domain name registra-
tions to infer sets of malicious, not-yet-blacklisted domains based on initial seed domain
names. Similarly, Sato et al. [78] extended blacklists by studying the co-occurrence of
DNS queries with known blacklisted domains. Recently, Antonakakis et al. [79] presented
Notos, a dynamic reputation system for domain names using behavioral features from pas-
sive DNS trafﬁc. Similarly, Bilge et al. [80] introduced EXPOSURE, a system to detect
malicious domain names involved in malicious activities. Both Notos and EXPOSURE
extract their evidence from passive DNS datasets and then apply data mining algorithms
to calculate domain reputation. In order to keep up with the fast growing number of mali-
cious domains, KOPIS [81] has been proposed to extend and detect new related malicious
domains by observing DNS patterns from the upper DNS hierarchy. Recently, GZA [82]
used game theory during the dynamic analysis of malware instances to reveal its alternative
domains. These studies focused on the construction or the extension of blacklists. How-
ever, there is no work on dynamically evaluating the level of maliciousness of the abused
domains included in these blacklists. Certain works use the knowledge of blacklists to con-
struct group reputations. For instance, Stone-Gross et al. [83] address the identiﬁcation
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of rogue networks by checking the presence of a large number of long-lived, misbehaving
hosts within three different sources of malicious activities. Similarly, Kalafut et al. [84]
show the possibility to derive the reputation of ISP networks by combining different exist-
ing public blacklists. Collins et al. [85] use the fact that malicious networks tend to abuse
weakly protected networks. Based on this observation, they deﬁned a network based qual-
ity uncleanliness indicator to quantify the existence of malicious hosts. Roveta et al. [86]
presented a visualization tool to explore the behavioral pattern inside rogue AS in order to
facilitate the identiﬁcation of malicious events.
The Fast-Flux technique has captured the attention of many researchers to study and
analyze botnets that are using this mechanism. For example, Holz et al. [87] introduced a
complete study and analysis of Fast-Flux Service Networks (FFSNs) that are used by spam-
ming botnets. They presented different metrics, which can be used to identify malicious
fast-ﬂux activities. Furthermore, they studied the characteristics of FFSNs and developed
detection algorithms that ﬁrst extract URL links inside spam emails and then, using a linear
classiﬁer, identify FFSNs based on the number of unique IP addresses in DNS queries, the
number of unique Autonomous System (AS) [88] numbers of those IP addresses, and the
number of NS records in a single lookup. In another work, Nazario and Holz [89] continued
the analysis with live network traces, which reveal botnet memberships and domain names.
They extended the heuristic features of FFSNs that are used by botnets. Passerini et al. [90]
introduced a set of features to characterize FFSNs. Their approach, called FluXOR, collects
suspected domain names from different sources, monitors their DNS response messages
over speciﬁc periods of time, and then uses a trained naïve Bayesian classiﬁer to classify
these domain names as either benign or malicious FFSNs. Similarly, Caglayan et al. [91]
presented a distributed architecture of web services to detect FFSNs activities using active
and passive monitoring of DNS properties.
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DGA was recently introduced by botnets to add another layer of DNS abuse. In-
fected machines use DGA to periodically generate domain name lists and then reach the
botnet infrastructure. Stone-Gross et al. [21] reported the experience of such botnets by
over-controlling the Torbig botnet by reverse engineering the DGA algorithm. Bilge et al.
[80] captured DGA domains by observing some behavioral features from the passive DNS
trafﬁc. Domains that are generated by DGA may not always be registered by the botmasters
for different reasons. Pleiades [26] has been proposed to utilize this behavior by observing
Non-existent Internet Domain Name (NXDOMAIN) DNS response messages. Domains
with NXDOMAIN responses were inspected against certain statistical features to detect
C&C servers and cluster botnets.
Unlike previous works on reputation systems, we do not only detect malicious domain
names; rather, we are proposing a dynamic scoring mechanism for evaluating the severity
and the maliciousness of each domain and name server.
2.2.4 Payload Distribution via DNS
The use of DNS as a communication medium for payload distribution is relatively new and
research activities on this topic are limited. Although these studies are scattered, they can
be roughly grouped under four categories: the malicious channels in DNS protocol, the
feasibility of using DNS in malicious activities, the detection of DNS tunnels, and using
DNS trafﬁc for detecting other malicious activities.
Malicious Channels in DNS Protocol: Dietrich et al. [16] are the ﬁrst to discuss the ex-
istence of botnets that tunnel the C&C channels through DNS. They discovered a malware
family Feederbot that exﬁltrates data within DNS query sub-domain labels and inﬁltrates
the attack payloads in DNS response packets. Their detection method introduces the ex-
traction of several features from the response data. While their work showed promising
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results, it is limited to the detection of aggressive DNS tunnels for C&C channels. Malware
families are using more resilient methods for receiving the attack payloads through DNS
rather than DNS tunneling [14]. Furthermore, their work focused on the assumption that
there will be a certain degree of trafﬁc, while our analysis showed that some families use
the DNS to receive a very limited amount of payload, such as the Morto family. Moreover,
we found that malware might not receive Base32 or Base64 encoded payload, but rather
clear text in TXT records.
Feasibility of using DNS for Malicious Activities: Xu et al. [92] introduced a resilient
mechanism for bots to create covert channels through DNS for C&C communications. They
designed a stealthy C&C that supports two different modes. The Codeword mode creates
a uni-directional communication channel that pulls the attack payload. The tunneled mode
creates a bi-directional communication channel between bots and the C&C server. They
also mentioned techniques to increase the stealth of these channels to make these queries
virtually undetectable from the host perspective. In fact, during our analysis in passive
DNS and malware datasets, we found that their proposed methods are already used by some
malware families, such as Feederbot [16] and Morto [14]. While their technique can easily
defeat host-based detection mechanisms, we are able to detect these malicious channels in
passive DNS trafﬁc. We also discovered that malware families using bi-directional channels
are often easily detected due to extensive trafﬁc. Similarly, Raman et al. [93] proposed
a network penetration technique that uses DNS tunneling to inﬁltrate the attack payload.
Their technique is based on establishing a tunnel via an exploit code. Our system can detect
the payload distribution channel in passive DNS regardless of the format of the payload,
as we do not inspect the content of DNS messages. There are several studies on building
a covert channel using DNS query and response packets [94, 95, 96, 97, 29]. They discuss
the possibility of sending and receiving data through DNS query response packets as well
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as the performance analysis of existing DNS tunneling tools.
Detection of DNSTunnels: There are some proposed methods for detecting DNS tunneling
within a network by using the n-gram analysis [98, 99]. Promising results were presented
in terms of detecting the tunnels; however, malicious payload distribution channels often
do not have extensive upstream data, and thus do not show this characteristic feature of
DNS tunneling tools. Therefore, any string based analysis on the queries might not reveal
signiﬁcant differences between regular and malicious queries to detect these channels. Our
system also detects the payload distribution channels regardless of the syntax by using DNS
zone activities.
Detecting other Malicious Activities in DNS: Choi et al. [100] proposed an algorithm to
detect the botnet activities based on DNS queries. They targeted the similarity of queries
of bots from the same botnet. Although they are focusing on query similarities, we focus
on query and response patterns as well as the DNS zone activities. Finally, there is also
some work on detection of malicious activities in passive DNS [79, 26, 80, 101]. These
proposed methods focused on analyzing other abuses of the DNS protocol, such as the
domain reputation problem and DGA-generated domain names.
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Chapter 3
On the Analysis of the Zeus Botnet
Crimeware Toolkit
In this chapter, we present a case study on the reverse engineering steps necessary to under-
stand the inner working of the Zeus crimeware toolkit and its components.
The Zeus crimeware toolkit has become one of the favorite tools for hackers because
of its user-friendly interface and its competitive price in the underground communities. This
crimeware allows attackers to conﬁgure and create malicious binaries, which are mainly
used to steal users’ Internet banking accounts, credit cards, and other sensitive informa-
tion that can be sold on the black market [102]. It also has the ability to administrate the
collected stolen information through the use of a control panel, which is used to monitor,
control, and manage the infected systems. In fact, this prediction was conﬁrmed in July
2009 when a security publication from Damballa positioned Zeus as the number one botnet
threat with 3.6 million infections in the US alone (roughly 19% of the installed base of
PCs in the US [103]). It was also estimated that Zeus is guilty in 44% of banking malware
infections [104]. Symantec Corporation referred to this crimeware toolkit as the “King of
the Underground Crimeware Toolkits” [105]. To the best of our knowledge, there has been
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no reverse engineering attempt to de-obfuscate and analyze Zeus before the publication of
our work [34].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 is dedicated to the
description of the Zeus crimeware toolkit components and how they are integrated. Section
3.2 details the network behavior analysis that is inferred from observing the network trafﬁc
between a bot instance and the associated C&C server. In Section 3.3, we detail the four
obfuscation levels and explain how they have been uncovered. This step led to the actual un-
obfuscated code of the bot and to later revealing the infection/installation process, as well
as the encryption key that makes it possible to decrypt the C&C communications between
the infected machine and the botnet infrastructure. We also present a sample decrypted
communication session between an infected machine and a C&C server. Our conclusion is
given in Section 3.4.
3.1 Description of the Zeus Crimeware Toolkit
The Zeus crimeware toolkit is a set of programs that have been designed to set up a bot-
net over a high-scaled networked infrastructure. Generally, the Zeus botnet aims to make
machines behave as spying agents with the intent of obtaining ﬁnancial beneﬁts. The Zeus
malware has the ability to log inputs that are entered by the user as well as to capture and
alter data that are displayed into web-pages [102]. Stolen data can contain email addresses,
passwords, online banking accounts, credit card numbers, and transaction authentication
numbers. In our analysis, we examine the Zeus crimeware toolkit v.1.2.4.2, which is the
latest stable publicly available version in the underground community. As depicted in Fig-
ure 3.1, the overall structure of the Zeus crimeware toolkit consists of ﬁve components:
1. A control panel containing a set of PHP scripts that are used to monitor the botnet
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Figure 3.1: The Zeus crimeware toolkit components.
and collect the stolen information into a MySQL database and then display it to the
botmaster. It also allows the botmaster to monitor, control, and manage bots that are
registered within the botnet.
2. Conﬁguration ﬁles that are used to customize the botnet parameters. It involves two
ﬁles: the conﬁguration ﬁle config.txt that lists the basic information, and the web
injects ﬁle webinjects.txt that identiﬁes the targeted websites and deﬁnes the con-
tent injection rules.
3. A generated encrypted conﬁguration ﬁle config.bin. This holds an encrypted ver-
sion of the conﬁguration parameters of the botnet.
4. A generated malware binary ﬁle bot.exe. This is the bot binary ﬁle that infects the
victims’ machines.
5. A builder program that generates two ﬁles: the encrypted conﬁguration ﬁle con-
fig.bin and the malware (actual bot) binary ﬁle bot.exe.
32
On the C&C side, the crimeware toolkit can easily set up the C&C server through an in-
stallation script that conﬁgures the database and the control panel. The database is used to
store information related to the botnet and any updated reports from the bots. These updates
contain stolen information gathered by the bots from the infected machines. The control
panel provides a user-friendly interface to display the content of the database as well as to
communicate with the rest of the botnet using PHP scripts. The botnet conﬁguration infor-
mation is composed of two parts: a static part and a dynamic part. In addition, each Zeus
instance retains a set of targeted URLs that are fed by the web injects ﬁle webinject.txt.
Instantly, Zeus targets these URLs to steal information and to modify the content of speciﬁc
web pages before they get displayed on the user’s screen. The attacker can deﬁne rules that
are used to harvest data from web forms. When a victim visits a targeted site, the bot steals
the credentials that are entered by the victim. Afterward, it posts the encrypted informa-
tion to a drop location used to store the bot update reports. This server decrypts the stolen
information and stores it into a database.
3.2 Zeus Botnet Network Analysis
In this section, we explain the network communication that occurs between the C&C server
(the server containing the control panel) and an infected machine. Such an analysis can be
used to write IDS rules and AV detection routines. In order to perform the network analysis,
we built a sandbox environment to collect and analyze the network traces generated from
the communication between the C&C server and one of the bot instances. We conﬁgured
a web server, which acts as the C&C server and the drop location. This server hosts all
resources that are required to operate the botnet (config.bin ﬁle, PHP scripts and the
MySQL database). To customize the malware, we used the builder program to generate
the malware binary ﬁle, which is conﬁgured to communicate with the C&C server. Within
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our environment, fake websites are generated to reﬂect real scenarios of botnet attacks. All
necessary entries of the conﬁguration ﬁle as well as the web injects scripts are modiﬁed to
target the fake website. After infecting and running a machine manually with the bot binary
ﬁle, we collected network traces for one day. During this session, the user of the infected
machine visited the targeted website and used login credentials, personal information, and
credit card information for testing purposes.
By analyzing the bot network communications, we can learn the overall behavior
of the Zeus botnet. The network behavior of the Zeus botnet constitutes a starting point
where we can dig into the crimeware toolkit functionalities. Since the Zeus botnet is based
on the HTTP protocol, it uses a pull-method to synchronize the botnet communications.
From the collected network traces between a bot and a C&C server, we observe that the bot
periodically checks a speciﬁc server for an up-to-date conﬁguration and bot binary ﬁles.
The HTTP communication messages between the two entities are encrypted. By observing
the network trace, we managed to determine the following communication pattern between
the C&C server and the infected machine:
1. The infected client starts the communication by sending a request message GET /con-
fig.bin to the C&C server. This message is a request to fetch the conﬁguration ﬁle
for the botnet.
2. The C&C server replies with the encrypted conﬁguration ﬁle config.bin.
3. The client receives the encrypted conﬁguration ﬁle and decrypts its contents using an
encryption key, which is embedded inside the bot binary ﬁle.
4. In a situation where the botmaster wants to involve the infected machine to manage
the botnet, the infected machine has to provide its external IP address and report any
use of Network Address Translation (NAT). In order to know the external IP address
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that is seen by the botnet servers, the infected machine makes a request to a speciﬁc
server. Subsequently, this server informs the infected machine about their externally
facing IP address. The server’s URL is provided in the static conﬁguration ﬁle.
5. The bot posts the stolen information and its updated status reports to the C&C server
POST/gate.php.
GET / config.bin 
<encrypted> config.bin 
Zeus Bot Client Zeus C&C Infrastructure 





POST / gate.php 
Figure 3.2: Communication pattern of Zeus.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the communication pattern between the C&C server and the
infected machine. The communication pattern is repeated frequently depending on a timing
variable, which is deﬁned in the botnet conﬁguration ﬁle.
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3.3 Reverse Engineering Analysis
The increasing use of malicious software has pushed security experts to try to ﬁnd the
secrets related to the development of malware design. A common technique to detect the
existence of a given malware is to track system modiﬁcations. The changes include what an
operating system runs at startup, default web pages, generated trafﬁc, infection of processes,
packing/unpacking of binaries, and changes to the registry keys. One way to look for these
changes is to reverse engineer the malware and try to reveal what is hidden behind the
assembled code. In our case, this kind of analysis provides invaluable insight into the inner
working of the crimeware toolkit in general and the malware binary in particular. In this
line of thought, we investigate the builder program and malware binary ﬁle. To this end, we
mainly employ “IDA Pro” [106] to disassemble the binaries and debug them to understand
their business logic. The analysis is two-fold: ﬁrst, an analysis that is related to the builder
program; second, an analysis that is linked to the malware binary ﬁle.
3.3.1 The Zeus Builder Program Analysis
The builder is one of the components of the Zeus crimeware toolkit. It uses the conﬁgu-
ration ﬁles as an input to generate the bot binary ﬁle and the encrypted conﬁguration ﬁle.
The builder component resides in the hands of the botmasters to customize and create new
malware samples to be delivered to the victims.
We ﬁrst analyze the builder program, as it uses a known obfuscation technique that
can be easily removed. In addition, the GUI allows us to categorize different subroutines,
which make up the builder program functionalities. Using the “PaiMei” reverse engineering
framework [107] (a reverse engineering framework that provides many reverse engineering
tasks, such as fuzzer assistance, code coverage tracking, and data ﬂow tracking), we were
able to see exactly which functions of the builder program are invoked by a speciﬁc action.
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This signiﬁcantly aids in simplifying the reverse engineering efforts as it allows us to focus
on a few key subroutines at a time. In what follows, we summarize the reverse engineering
analysis of the functionalities of the builder program.
Building the Conﬁguration File Functionality: This function is responsible for encod-
ing the clear text of the conﬁguration ﬁles of the botnet into a speciﬁc structure. It
subsequently encrypts the whole structure with the RC4 encryption algorithm using
the conﬁgured encryption key.
Building the Malware Binary File Functionality: The main function of the builder pro-
gram resides within this functionality, which is responsible for building the cus-
tomized malware binary ﬁles. In general, it builds the malware executable ﬁle into a
portable executable (PE) standard format. It also sets some parameters according to
the current conﬁguration ﬁle and then produces the malware binary ﬁle.
Malware Infection Removal Functionality: The builder has a functionality that ascer-
tains the presence of the Zeus bot and removes it. When this functionality runs, it
performs a detection routine by checking the existence of special registry keys that
are inserted during the bot infection process. It also detects the presence of some ﬁles
in the system. If these ﬁles are detected, the builder program cleans some registry
keys and instructs the bot to shut itself down and then deletes the stored Zeus binary
ﬁle from the system. Upon reception of the shutdown command, the expected behav-
ior of the bot is to disinfect itself from the currently running processes. The analysis
reveals the names of ﬁles whose presence in the system is checked by the builder.
Table 3.1 represents these ﬁle names with their descriptions.
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File Description
C:/WINDOWS/system32/sdra64.exe A copy of a bot, which has infected
“system32” folder.
C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/local.ds A data storage ﬁle, used to store
the conﬁguration ﬁle that is used
locally by a given bot in the sys-
tem.
C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/user.ds A data storage ﬁle, used to log
the users’ activities that have been
recorded by the bot.
Table 3.1: Description of the ﬁles that are created during the bot infection.
3.3.2 Zeus Bot Binary Analysis
As depicted in Figure 3.3, the bot binary ﬁle contains four segments: a “text/code” segment,
an “imports” segment, a “resources” segment, and a “data” segment. We begin our analysis
at the malware Entry Point (EP) that resides in the “text/code” segment. The initial analysis
of the disassembly reveals that only a small part of the “text/code” block is a set of valid
computer instructions. The remainder of the binary is highly obfuscated, preventing the
computer from using these segments directly unless they are de-obfuscated at some stages.
De-obfuscation Process
Using the “IDA Pro” debugger, we were able to debug the malware and walk through
the instructions to analyze and understand the logic of the de-obfuscation routines. Each
routine reveals speciﬁc information used by the other routines until all obfuscation layers
are removed. The ﬁrst de-obfuscation routine contains a 4-byte long decryption key and a
one-byte long seed value. These two values are used to decrypt a block of data from the
“text/code” segment and then write the decrypted data in the virtual memory. The result of
the ﬁrst de-obfuscation routine revealed some new code segments. These segments contain

















Figure 3.3: Segments of the bot.exe binary ﬁle.
address of the memory for the code segments was 0x390000. After the address space of
the second de-obfuscation routine, there was an 8-byte key that the “IDA Pro” incorrectly
identiﬁed as code instructions. Figure 3.5 illustrates the location of the 8-byte key. In what
follows, we explain the main logic of the second de-obfuscation routine.
1. First, the routine copies two binary blocks from the “text/code” segment, concate-
nates them, and writes them into the virtual memory. The ﬁrst text block contains
data with many zero value bytes that will be ﬁlled by the next text block as shown in
Figure 3.6.
2. Second, the routine scans every byte in the ﬁrst text block and when it encounters
a “hole” (zero byte), it overwrites the zero byte with the next available byte in the
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De-obfuscation 2









Figure 3.4: De-obfuscated code in the virtual memory.
“ﬁller” text block. This is repeated until all “holes” are ﬁlled (See Figure 3.7).
The ﬁlled text segment turns out to be the main outcome of the second de-obfuscation
routine. However, this text segment is still not readable and is not considered as computer
instructions. By utilizing the 8-byte key, the third de-obfuscation routine starts by decrypt-
ing the output of the second de-obfuscation. Similar to the ﬁrst de-obfuscation routine,
this routine utilizes the 8-byte key and performs an Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation instead
of an addition operation. Finally, the fourth de-obfuscation layer contains heavy compu-
tations to initialize and prepare parameters for the rest of the malware operations. It uses
the decrypted bytes revealed by the previous routines to modify the rest of the “text/code”
segment. After this routine is completed, we can observe the real starting point of the Zeus
malware. Although the “text/code” segment is now valid, the Zeus bot binary employs two
additional layers of obfuscation. These two layers are de-obfuscated during the installa-
tion procedure. They consist of logical loops that transform arbitrarily long strings into
a readable text. The ﬁrst layer is performed on a set of strings that the malware uses to
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Figure 3.5: The 8-byte key.
load the Dynamic Link Library (DLL), retrieve function names, and for other purposes dur-
ing the installation process as described in Algorithm 3.3.1. Similarly, the second layer is




String new_string = new String(enc_string.length());




new_string[i] = (enc_string[i] + seed) %256;
seed = (seed + 2);
return (new_string)
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Figure 3.6: The virtual memory used by the second de-obfuscation routine.
Algorithm 3.3.2: DECRYPT_URL(enc_url)
String new_url = new String(enc_url.length());




if (i%2 == 0)
then
new_url[i] = (enc_url[i] + 0xF6 - i * 2) %256;
else
new_url[i] = (enc_url[i] + 0x7 + i * 2)%256;
return (new_url)
Bot Installation Process
Following execution of the ﬁrst four de-obfuscation routines, the malware begins the in-









00 42 E1 C1
50 00 B3 C1
12 2D 00 BD
00 F2 6C BB
7E 62 82 A4
7E 42 E1 C1 
50 62 B3 C1 
12 2D 82 BD 
A4 F2 6C BB 
Text with missing data
Filler text
Filled text
Figure 3.7: The result from the second de-obfuscation routine.
malware. In what follows, we explain the main procedure of the installation process.
1. The Zeus malware dynamically loads the LoadLibrary and the GetProcAddress
methods from Kernel32.dll library.
2. The Zeus malware decrypts the set of strings, which become DLL methods names,
into the virtual memory according to Algorithm 3.3.1.
3. The LoadLibrary and the GetProcAddress methods are used to load further meth-
ods, as decrypted in step 2, from the Windows DLLs.
4. The Zeus malware enumerates the current process table searching for targeted pro-
cesses, such as the main process name for the Outpost personal ﬁrewall application
from Agnitum Security [108] outpost.exe and the main process name for the per-
sonal ﬁrewall of the ZoneLabs Internet security [109] zlclient.exe. If any of these
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processes are found, the Zeus malware aborts the installation process.
5. The Zeus malware appends the path C:/Windows/System32/sdra64.exe to the
HKEY_
LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/WindowsNT/CurrentVersion/Winlogo
n/Userinit registry key. This entry enables the Zeus malware to initiate its installa-
tion process again during Windows startup.
6. Finally, the Zeus malware injects its entire binary ﬁle from the memory address
0x400000 to 0x417000 into the virtual memory of the winlogon.exe process. Fol-
lowing this, Zeus passes control to this process by creating a new user thread, which
is immediately executed.
Similarly, the bot uses these steps when the infected machine is restarted. However, certain
steps are performed only during the initial Zeus installation process. These steps involve
the creation of a local copy of the malware and storing it on the infected system for fur-
ther activities. In what follows, we list the main processes of creating a local copy of the
malware.
(a) The Zeus malware searches for any existing copies of previous Zeus infection ﬁles
sdra64.exe and erases it from the infected machine. This behavior occurs when the
Zeus binary ﬁle is being updated with a newer version of the malware.
(b) The bot makes an exact copy of itself and saves it to C:/Windows/System32/sdra64.exe.
To evade signature-based detection systems, it appends some randomly generated bytes
to the end of the ﬁle.
(c) In order to hide itself, the bot duplicates the Modiﬁcation, Access, and Creation times
(MAC times) information from the Ntdll.dll library, and applies them to the sdra64.exe.
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The purpose is to make sdra64.exe appear as a system ﬁle that has been present since
Windows was ﬁrst installed.
(d) In another level of hiding the created ﬁle, the bot sets the sdra64.exe ﬁle attributes to
system and hidden, so that the user cannot see the ﬁle using the standard ﬁle explorer.
At this stage, the malware is already injected within the winlogon.exe running pro-
cess. The currently running bot exits and leaves the control to the injected process. How-
ever, the installation procedure is continued by the user thread that was started in the win-
logon.exe process as described in step 6. From the injection process, we infer that the
entire Zeus binary ﬁle is copied into the winlogon.exe process. Therefore, the injected
Zeus instance starts by removing the remaining two layers of the obfuscation by applying
Algorithm 3.3.1 and Algorithm 3.3.2 as described in Section 3.3.2. When the injected mal-
ware decrypts all the strings, the Zeus instance employs the piggyback thread technique (to
control the infected system through a legitimate process) within the winlogon.exe pro-
cess. However, Zeus instances only perform a few tasks before they create another thread
and exit themselves. This is yet another attempt made by the designers of the Zeus malware
to evade detection. Subsequently, the Zeus instance starts injecting itself into another pro-
cess, namely the svchost.exe process. This injected process initiates a communication
channel with the C&C server to download the latest updates for the conﬁguration ﬁle and
the malware itself. The targeted processes later get injected with the latest malware pay-
load and then activate the process of stealing information through API hooking techniques.
During the malware update process, the following changes were observed in the ﬁle system:
1. A new folder is created at the path C:/Windows/System32/lowsec. Hiding tech-
niques similar to those applied to the sdra64.exe are also applied to the newly cre-
ated folder.
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Command Purpose Return Value
1 Retrieve Zeus version number 4 bytes in a buffer
2 Retrieve name of the botnet Ascii string in buffer
3 Uninstall Bot n/a
4 Open the local.ds ﬁle or create it if
it does not exist
n/a
5 Close the local.ds ﬁle n/a
6 Open the user.ds or create it if it
does not exist
n/a
7 Close the user.ds n/a
8 Close the sdra64.exe n/a
9 Open the sdra64.exe n/a
10 Retrieve loader ﬁle path Wide character string
11 Retrieve conﬁguration ﬁle path Wide character string
12 Retrieve log ﬁle path Wide character string
13 Crash the winlogon process inten-
tionally
n/a
Table 3.2: List of the Zeus malware commands.
2. Two new ﬁles, local.ds and user.ds, are created and placed in the new folder.
The user.ds stores the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle, and the local.ds logs the stolen
information until the Zeus malware is ready to send it to the drop location.
The malware that resides in the winlogon.exe process acts as the brain for the Zeus
malware activities. It communicates and coordinates all the infected processes using the
named pipe _AVIRA_2109. Table 3.2 shows the list of numerical commands that are sup-
ported by the Zeus malware.
Key Extraction
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the Zeus botnet uses a conﬁguration ﬁle that contains static
information. This part of the conﬁguration is stored inside the malware binary ﬁle in a spe-
ciﬁc structure. During the de-obfuscation processes, this structure is recovered and placed
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in the virtual memory (in our analysis, starting at 0x416000). All information in the struc-
ture is completely de-obfuscated, except for two URLs: url_compip and url_config.
These URLs can be de-obfuscated using Algorithm 3.3.2. The url_compip is the web
location to determine the IP address of the infected host, and the url_config is the web
location to download the conﬁguration ﬁle for the botnet. The static conﬁguration structure
also contains an RC4 substitution table that is generated by the encryption key speciﬁed
in the conﬁguration ﬁle. Throughout our analysis, we noticed that the substitution table
was generated by the RC4’s key-scheduling algorithm, and we veriﬁed that the encryption
employed by Zeus is done by the RC4 algorithm. The recovered static conﬁguration can
be used in different ways to gain partial control over the botnet. The most valuable piece
of information is the substitution table, which can be used to decrypt all communication of
the Zeus botnet. Moreover, it can be used to decrypt the conﬁguration ﬁle as well as the
stolen information. In order to recover the static conﬁguration structure described above,
we must go through all of the de-obfuscation phases discussed in Section 3.3.2. This re-
quires executing the malware until it completes all of the de-obfuscation layers. Emulation
techniques are considered as safe and fast procedures to achieve our goals. Using Python
scripting language along with the “IDAPython” plugin [110], we were able to emulate all of
the de-obfuscation routines and extract the substitution table from the static conﬁguration
structure. These extracted keys allow for decryption of the botnet communication trafﬁc
and all of the encrypted ﬁles. Similarly, they allow us to extract any information from the
static conﬁguration structure, such as the URLs for any future updates, which point to the
C&C servers. Our experimental results demonstrate that any subversion of Zeus (v.1.2.x.x)
can be fully analyzed using our methodology as it holds the same logical blocks.
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3.3.3 Packet Decryption
After extracting the RC4 encryption key as described in Section 3.3.2, we used it to decrypt
the botnet communications. By decrypting the transmitted HTTP payload, we were able to
uncover the structure of the messages between the bot and the C&C server. We analyzed
the structure of the HTTP POST messages (POST /gate.php), which carry all the updates
and reports from the bots to the C&C server. Each bot posts a variable number of encrypted
bytes based on the data sent to the C&C server in a speciﬁc structure. The payload is
encrypted using only an RC4 encryption algorithm. As depicted in Figure 3.8, we restore
the structure of the messages as follows:
1. Each message starts with a header that consists of 28-bytes. This header contains an
MD5 hash value for the rest of the message.
2. As shown in Figure 3.8, the rest of the message follows in the form of repeated data
blocks, where each block consists of the following:
(a) An entry header of 16-bytes that contains information about the current data
entry. The ﬁrst 4-bytes serve as the type of the reported information, which can
be recognized by the bot and the control panel. The third 4-bytes determine the
length of the carried information.
(b) A variable number of bytes that is speciﬁed in the entry header. These bytes
represent one piece of the information that is transmitted within this packet.
It should be noted that the encrypted communication of the Zeus botnet is vulnerable
to the RC4 keystream reuse attack because there is no Initialization Vector (IV) setup in
every session, i.e., the same RC4 keystream is reused to encrypt all messages.
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8E020000 0000000000000000 0C0000005B626D42FC682051D56D72A4
20270000 00000000 0D010000 0D010000 
Message length Unknown Md5 hash value 












4-bytes 4-bytes 4-bytes 4-bytes
4-bytes 8-bytes 16-bytes
Figure 3.8: A decrypted sample message.
3.4 Conclusion
The Zeus crimeware toolkit is an advanced tool used to generate very effective malware
that facilitates criminal activities. The integrated toolkit technology impedes the detection
of the malware at the host level. The use of encrypted HTTP messages for C&C makes
it difﬁcult to detect any clear behavior at the network level. Moreover, the multiple levels
of malware obfuscation represent a burden to the analysts to ﬁnd information about the
C&C servers or to generate binary signatures. In this work, we presented a detailed reverse
engineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit to unveil its underlying architecture and
enable its mitigation. Furthermore, we provided a breakdown for the structure of the Zeus
botnet network messages.
Our analysis of the C&C communications indicates that the RC4 algorithm is used in
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a poor way to encrypt these communications (keystream reuse). In addition to the knowl-
edge of the network messages structure, we can launch active countermeasures by interact-
ing with the botnet servers using the extracted encryption key. For example, we can inject
falsiﬁed information into the botnet communication for various purposes, such as defaming
the botnet business model by reducing the effectiveness of their services [111, 112]. A use-
ful extension to our work is to use the extracted encryption key mechanism to analyze and




Cyber Security Intelligence Extraction
from Malware Analysis
Dynamic analysis of malware samples can be used to generate useful cyber security intel-
ligence. The reports produced during the dynamic analysis process represent an immediate
source for collecting preliminary information about a given malicious threat. Since mali-
cious networks tend to reuse their resources such as source codes, domain names and IP
addresses for different purposes, the network analysis enables us to capture relations be-
tween the shared resources. For instance, cyber criminals abuse IP addresses and domain
names and adopt techniques such as Fast-Flux and DGA; these leave traces, which can
be backtracked by simply correlating their activities. Moreover, the structure of malicious
networks manifests information about the abused resources behavior and the importance
of each individual resource. In this chapter, we present a framework for extracting cyber
threat intelligence from the reports that are generated during the dynamic analysis of mal-
ware samples. Our framework utilizes the extracted information from the malware dynamic
analysis reports to explore the infrastructure properties of malicious networks.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Our framework is described in Sec-
tion 4.1. Section 4.2 explains our dataset and presents the insights produced from our
framework via an experiment on real-world malware dynamic analysis reports. Finally,
Section 4.3 provides concluding remarks.
4.1 Framework Description
The process of dynamic analysis monitors the analyzed malware samples and records a de-
tailed behavioral report about various observed activities. The monitored activities include,
but are not limited to, system changes, ﬁle records, registry entries, and network activities.
Our framework utilizes dynamic analysis reports that are produced by analyzing malware
samples in a controlled environment. The framework accepts as input these reports for
each analyzed malware and produces insights that can be used in various cyber attack in-
vestigations. The main components of our framework are shown in Figure 4.1. Once the
reports are generated by the dynamic analysis, the pre-processing module is responsible
for extracting information from the reports and storing it in a graph database. The graph
database enables us to keep track of relations between the analyzed malware samples, do-
main names, and IP addresses in order to conduct various network structure analyses. The
database is also supported by external information that helps in localizing resources and tag
activities to possible malware families. Given any cyber attack investigation, the statistical
analysis provides valuable insights. The network structure analysis investigates the rela-
tions between abused resources and evaluates the importance of each individual resource to
understand the key components in the malicious infrastructure. In what follows, we provide











Figure 4.1: Intelligence framework overview.
4.1.1 Pre-Processing
Our framework processes malware dynamic analysis reports, which are generated in a con-
trolled environment. Each report contains detailed information about the activities con-
ducted by the analyzed malware sample in Extensible Markup Language (XML) format.
The reported activities cover the local system activities and the network interactions. Sys-
tem information records any observable changes to the ﬁle system, registry keys, memory
operations, and loaded libraries. The network information captures the interaction between
the observed malware sample and any remote or local network resource. The sandbox sys-
tem used in the dynamic analysis process decodes various network protocols, such as DNS,
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HTTP, FTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), and IRC. It also stores the raw network
packets for further inspection. In our framework, we focus only on the network activities;
we do not evaluate local system events.
The parsing engine begins by creating a unique proﬁle for each report using the hash
value of the malware binary. The parser then extracts any possible communication activities
to external resources and records all observed IP addresses and domain names. These IP
addresses and domain names are used to conduct various activities by different network
protocols as summarized in Table 4.1.
Category Extracted Information
FTP User name, password, FTP command, ports
HTTP Method, URL, ports
IRC User name, password, host name, server name,
real name, nick, channel name, channel pass-
word, private message, notice message
DNS Name server, query name, query type, query
class, answer name, answer type, answer
class, answer TTL, answer length, NS name,
CNAME, TXT, PTR, ports
Plain connection 1 Data sent, data received
SMTP User name, password, mail from, recipients,
ports
Downloaded ﬁles Download URL, local ﬁle name, local ﬁle hash
Table 4.1: Example of extracted information from malware dynamic analysis reports.
Our framework utilizes additional external resources to complement the information
extracted from the dynamic analysis reports. Since we are dealing with malware samples,
knowledge of the malware family of each analyzed malware sample is required in order to
enrich the cyber investigation process. Security experts and AV companies have long faced
the challenging task of consistently naming malware families. With the number of new
malware samples growing by the day, the problem of classifying malware by a common
1In plain connection, the underlying protocol cannot be decoded by the sandbox system.
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name is becoming more and more difﬁcult. Many attempts have been made by researchers
and AV vendors [113, 114] to solve this issue; however, very little success has been shown.
To overcome this problem, we propose a solution that takes into consideration all of the
reported family names from AV companies, and extracts the commonly used family name
accordingly. For each observed malware sample, we retrieve the family names from a public
web service called VirusTotal [115], which collects different AV companies (43 vendors)
scanning reports for a speciﬁc malware sample. We then extract the most frequent string
from all of the reports. In the following, we summarize the process of naming a given
malware sample:
1. We retrieve the naming reports from different AV companies for a given malware
hash value.
2. Malware names contain strings that indicate more information about a given mal-
ware sample, such as the targeted platform (e.g., Win32), the malware version (e.g.,
Zeus.B), or some classiﬁcation (e.g., Trojan or Adware). These strings are consid-
ered as extra information, which can be ignored while extracting the malware family
name.
3. Finally, we calculate the frequencies of the remaining strings inside all of the retrieved
reports from AV companies. The most common string is selected as the possible
malware family name.
4.1.2 Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis of the extracted information from malware dynamic analysis reports pro-
vides important insights, especially in the early stages of cyber investigations. Information
about targeted countries, targeted organizations, suspected malware families, and possible
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cyber criminals support and guide the process of taking the right steps towards a successful
investigation. For instance, monitoring the daily behavior of malware samples while com-
municating Internet resources (e.g., domain names and IP addresses) gives an overview of
the level of abuse of such resources.
Occasionally, botnets exploit or take advantage of speciﬁc network protocols. The
monitoring of malware communication with remote resources helps uncover possible ma-
licious activities. Network protocols contain detailed information that can be digested to
measure the level of abuse for any protocol or service. As an example, some malicious ac-
tivities can be distinguished by using special protocol conﬁgurations, which help recognize
them, such as payload distribution through DNS [14] and port0 activities [30].
Cyber criminals have many targeted objectives and they operate different campaigns
to increase their proﬁt. The functionality of malicious networks can therefore differ from
one to another. For example, the Waledac botnet mainly operates spam activities [116],
while the Sality botnet is responsible for many scanning incidents [117]. By observing the
daily activities of malware samples that belong to different malware families, we can infer
the nature of the malware activities and their evolution with time. Additionally, malware
families can be correlated with the abused resources, such as domains and IP addresses, to
guide cyber crime investigation.
4.1.3 Malicious Networks Analysis
The malware dynamic analysis reports include many relations between different Internet
resources that can be mapped to a graph. For instance, malware samples are contacting
domain names that resolve to IP addresses and are used to conduct speciﬁc activities. The
relation between malware samples, domain names, and IP addresses can be abstracted as a
directed graph that consists of a tuple Gmulti = 〈M∪D∪ IP,E〉, where:
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• M = {m1,m2, · · · ,mn} is a ﬁnite set of malware sample nodes
• D = {d1,d2, · · · ,dl} is a ﬁnite set of domain name nodes
• IP = {ip1, ip2, · · · , ipk} is a ﬁnite set of IP address nodes
• E ⊆ (M×D)∪ (D× IP) is a ﬁnite set of pairs of distinct nodes, called edges.
Gmulti is a 3-mode network composed of three different types of actors. Multi-mode
networks tend to form communities by utilizing shared properties. The overlapping proper-
ties are also used to simplify the network and focus on one actor in the network. In general,
multi-mode networks can be transformed into many one-mode networks in order to apply
most of the network analysis notions and compare networks. For example, a network of
domain names can be formed by considering the shared IP addresses or by considering the
malware instances, which access the domains. The transformation of a multi-mode net-
work to many one-mode networks is called projection [118], which produces weighted net-
works by deﬁning the weights as the number of common neighbors in Gmulti. The produced
weighted networks contain all of the structural information from the original network [119].
From Gmulti, we can derive different one-mode networks that represent many aspects
of the network. To limit the scope of our analysis, we focus on the following two graphs
that have domain names as the main actor.
Abused domains: GDM = 〈D,EDM〉, where EDM ⊆ (D×D). The graph GDM represents
the graph of domain names connected by a number of shared malware samples. A
domain di is connected to another domain d j when there is at least one malware
sample that accessed both di and d j. The graph GDM can be used to quantify the
abuse of domain names by malicious networks and also to group the domains that are
abused by the same malicious networks.
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Malicious infrastructure: GDIP = 〈D,EDIP〉, where EDIP ⊆ (D×D). The graph GDIP
models the relation between domain names that are resolved to a number of shared
IP addresses. A domain di is connected to another domain d j when there is at least
one malware sample that mapped both di and d j to the same IP address. The graph
GDIP reports the structure of malicious infrastructure and their robustness.
Given the above two networks, we can introduce a set of metrics that help us assess
the overall network structure and measure the importance of individual nodes.
Network Structure and Centrality Measures
There are several basic metrics that can be used to reveal the conﬁguration of any given
network and to quantify the relative importance of individual nodes. In what follows, we
study the k-neighborhood connectivity plot, degree centrality and betweenness centrality
metrics. The graph k-neighborhood connectivity plot characterizes graphs to identify the
strength of relationships between nodes. The degree and betweenness centrality are used to
identify the critical vertices in the graph. These metrics guide the cyber crime investigation
to understand the properties and the structure of malicious networks.
K-Neighborhood Connectivity plot (KNC-plot): Given a weighted graph G, where the
weights k represent the number of sharing neighbors, KNC-plot is an algorithm that
measures the connectivity of Gk as a function of k [120]. More precisely, the KNC-
plot is deﬁned as a function of k that shows the decreasing size of the largest compo-
nent and the increasing number of components. The connectivity of a graph provides
a global understanding of the captured network and a means to study the robustness
of the network. Given a weighted graph G, two nodes are k-neighbors if they share an
edge with the weight of at least k. As an example, the graph G1 contains all the nodes
that share edges with weights greater than or equal to one. This graph is considered
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to be a very highly connected graph. Similarly, G2 is deﬁned on the same nodes, but
it might be less connected. When increasing the degree of connectivity k, the graph
will become increasingly sparse and less connected until it becomes completely dis-
connected. The analysis of different Gk graphs enables us to understand the structure
of sharing resources within malicious networks.
Degree Centrality: Node degree is deﬁned as the number of edges that are shared with
neighboring nodes [121]. In a weighted graph, where edges have weights, nodes
have an important metric that measure their strength; this is computed for each node
by accumulating all the weights for all the direct neighboring nodes. The degree
centrality represents the connectivity of a node i in the network, which can be deﬁned














where ai j = 1 when node i and node j are direct neighbors and ai j = 0 otherwise.
The term wi j denotes the weight between the two adjacent nodes i and j. The term α
is a positive parameter that can be used to balance the importance between the node
degree and the strength, while calculating the degree centrality.
Betweenness Centrality: Betweenness centrality measures the importance of a node i be-
ing in the shortest path between two other nodes. When a node is included in many
shortest paths between other nodes, it has more control over the network by serving
as a bridge between nodes. This node can be considered as an intermediate node be-
tween different communities. The betweenness is deﬁned as the ratio of all shortest
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where σk j is the sum of all shortest paths between node k and node j, and σk j(i) is
the number of shortest paths that pass through node i to connect node k and node j.
The calculation of the shortest paths between nodes in weighted graphs is achieved via
Dijkstra’s algorithm [123] by considering the inverse of the weights between nodes as the
cost of including each edge [122].
The centrality measures discussed above, deﬁned at the node level, can be extended






where n is the number of nodes within the graph,C(ni) is the centrality value of node
i, and C(n∗) is the largest centrality value in the graph. The group centrality enables us to
compare different communities. To compare the group centrality of different graphs, the
CG value of each graph must be normalized with the maximum possible sum of differences
of node centralities calculated by Equation 4.3. The normalization values for degree and
betweenness are given by (n−1)(n−2) and (n−1), respectively [121].
4.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we present some of the intelligence that we extracted from the malware
dynamic analysis reports. We discuss some of the insights that are utilized from the statis-
tical analysis and the malicious network analysis. During our analysis, we use a dataset of
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dynamic analysis reports provided by ThreatTrack Security Inc [124] that spans from the
1st of January 2014 to the 4th of March 2014. In Table 4.2, we show some facts about the
dataset. Our framework utilizes the Neo4j graph database [125] to store the extracted in-
formation. We choose a graph database because it supports most of the functionalities and
algorithms of graph theories while maintaining ﬂexible and scalable storage capabilities.
Number of reports 1,573,214
Number of domains 49,375







Table 4.2: Statistics of the dataset used to evaluate the framework.
4.2.1 Statistical Insights
The ﬁrst step in investigating any cyber crime attack is to collect statistics about the inci-
dent. Our framework analyzes the malware dynamic analysis reports on a daily basis and
populates the Neo4j graph database with the extracted information. While populating the
database, we also include some external information to support the knowledge about ma-
licious activities. For instance, each observed IP address is correlated with the Maxmind
databases [126] to retrieve the geographic location and the ISP responsible for each IP
address. In addition, the framework also provides information about domain name registra-
tion, such as owner information, by correlating the observed domain names with the public
WHOIS records [127]. Figure 4.2 shows an example of the geolocation of some malicious
networks resources, while Figure 4.3 illustrates an example of statistics that are produced
by our framework.
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Figure 4.2: Geo-locating malicious networks.
Our framework provides complete information about connections conducted by IP
addresses. For example, FTP connections may point to drop or deposit locations that may
contain stolen credentials. On the other hand, IRC connections reveal the plain C&C com-
munication between bots and C&C servers. In addition, the protocol information helps us
investigate other abuses such as those involving the DNS protocol, which will be addressed
in Chapter 6.
Using the observed malware samples, we detect their corresponding families from
VirusTotal [115] by leveraging our proposed approach for naming the malware families as
discussed in Section 4.1.1. We recognize more than 3500 malware families, which corre-
sponds to 40% of the observed malware samples. The remaining malware samples were
either not recognized by VirusTotal, or no common name exists. In Figure 4.4, we show the
top 20 active malware families that are recognized during analysis. Such insight can help
us estimate the spread of different malware families. Certain malware families are special-
ized in conducting speciﬁc activities such as spamming (e.g., Virut), scanning (e.g., Sality),
or fake software downloaders (e.g., LoadMoney). Through analyzing the distribution of

















































































(d) Top 10 domains contacted by different mal-
ware samples.
Figure 4.3: Example of cyber intelligence extracted using the developed framework.
4.2.2 Malicious Networks Analysis
Studying the structure and properties of malicious network resources provides important
insights for a cyber crime investigation. In our analysis, we consider two different graphs:
abused domains GDM, and malicious infrastructure GDIP. Given these two graphs, we ana-
lyze their structural properties, investigate the importance of individual network resources,
and compare the networks centrality. In Table 4.3, we illustrate some of the general prop-
erties of the two graphs.
Abused Domains Networks
In this section, we explore domains abused by observed malware samples. During our ex-










































Figure 4.4: Top 20 observed malware families.
Within these networks, two domain names are connected with each other when at least
one malware sample has visited both domain names, and the strength of their relation is
weighted by the number of such malware samples. Studying the connectivity of the abused
domains by the KNC-plot enables us to analyze the strength of networks and understand
their level of involvement in malicious activities. In Table 4.4, we show some network
examples with the value of k for which the size of the largest subgraph in the network is
50%, 25%, 10% of the original network. Some networks may contain many domains (e.g.,
ID = DM1), but are weakly connected. This kind of network consists of domains that are
not largely abused by the malware community, or are part of domains randomly probed
by malware samples. In contrast, small networks can be very heavily abused in malicious
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Abused domains Malicious infrastructure
Number of domains 19,572 13,986
Number of networks 1,402 2,500
Average network size 13.9 5.6
Largest network size 14,671 3,148
Average degree 23.3 44.3
Average strength 242.1 105.7
Table 4.3: Abused domains and malicious infrastructure network statistics.
activities (e.g., network ID = DM2, DM3, DM4). Networks might contain a small number
of domains and be equally abused by groups of malware samples (e.g., ID = DM5, DM6).
These networks hold domains that are essential for operating the malicious network. For
instance, malware samples are normally conﬁgured to visit certain domain names to reach
the malicious infrastructure. An increase in the number of malware samples visiting a spe-
ciﬁc network indicates that the associated domains are correlated (i.e., targeted) by malware
community. In the KNC-plot, the domains that remain in the last connected component of
the network as k increases are considered as the most abused domains in their network.
ID Network size 50% 25% 10% Largest k value
DM1 14,671 2 5 15 21810
DM2 23 1,755 2,200 2,208 2246
DM3 24 6 28 31 45
DM4 49 4 12 24 44
DM5 28 50 51 0 52
DM6 10 145 0 0 165
Table 4.4: Value of k at which the largest subgraph in each network of GDM represent 50%,
25%, and 10%.
In Figure 4.5, we demonstrate an example of the KNC-plot of an abused network
DM4. As indicated in Table 4.4, 10% of the domain names in the network have at least
24 malware samples in common. These domains hold larger connectivity (more abused)
compared with the other domains in the network. On the other hand, Figure 4.6 illustrates
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Figure 4.6: Example of KNC-plot for the abused domains network DM5.
After studying the structure of abused domains networks, we investigate different
metrics to evaluate the importance of each domain in the network. In Table 4.5, we present
the group centrality values (calculated using Equation 4.3) for some of the abused networks.
In general, the group centrality of a network reﬂects the centrality of its nodes. The degree
centrality is an indicator of the existence of domains that are heavily abused by the malware
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community. The two networks DM2 and DM6 have a high degree centrality, which supports
the KNC-plot statistics previously discussed. Some networks might contain sub networks
that are connected by intermediate nodes that can be captured by the betweenness centrality
measure. For disturbing any network, good candidates to start with would be the domains
that have high betweenness centrality. The group betweenness centrality is used to capture
the existence of intermediate nodes in any network such as DM1, DM3, DM4, and DM6.
Network ID Network size Degree Betweenness
DM1 1,4671 0.0029 0.57
DM2 23 0.52 0.000069
DM3 24 0.083 0.4
DM4 49 0.048 0.43
DM5 28 0.076 0.098
DM6 10 0.70 0.54
Table 4.5: Group centrality for different abused domains network GDM.
Malicious Infrastructure Networks
In this section, we explore malicious infrastructures that consist of domain names connected
by shared IP addresses. Our analysis reveals 2,500 different networks that contain 13,986
domain names. Two domain names are connected with each other when there is at least one
shared IP address between both of them, and the strength of their relation is weighted by
the number of such shared IP addresses.
The connectivity of malicious infrastructures helps in understanding the nature of
the relationship between domains. Malicious networks tend to replicate their resources
in order to increase their availability, which strengthens their resiliency against take down
operations. This behavior is achieved by a technique called Fast-Flux, which simply assigns
multiple IP addresses for domain names. Using the KNC-plot, we can analyze the strength
of the relationship between domains and investigate the level of being a Fast-Flux network.
67
Table 4.6 shows some network examples with the value of k for which the size of the largest
subgraph in the network is 50%, 25%, 10% of the original network. A weak network is one
that requires less k values to disturb the connections between its domains, such as DIP1 and
DIP4. On the contrary, heavy networks that share many IP addresses between their domains,
such as network DIP2 and DIP3, are more resilient to IP address take down operations. On
occasion, malicious networks secure all of the used domains with the same IP address to
operate the network (e.g., DIP5, DIP6). Other networks maintain strong ties between all of
the abused domains, such as DIP7. In general, the core domains are the ones that remain in
the last connected component of the network as k increases. The larger the k value required
to dissolve the network, the more difﬁcult it becomes to take down the network.
ID Network size 50% 25% 10% Largest k value
DIP1 3,148 2 3 5 480
DIP2 233 20 65 161 951
DIP3 39 29 40 80 85
DIP4 116 4 7 12 20
DIP5 12 8 148 0 148
DIP6 16 11 45 0 48
DIP7 11 27 0 0 32
Table 4.6: Value of k at which the largest subgraph in each network of GDIP represent 50%,
25%, and 10%.
ID Network size Degree Betweenness
DIP1 3,148 0.00075 0.49
DIP2 233 0.0279 0.40
DIP3 39 0.037 0.049
DIP4 116 0.0065 0.34
DIP5 12 0.46 0.74
DIP6 16 0.079 0.061
DIP7 10 0.083 0.2
Table 4.7: Group centrality for different malicious infrastructure networks GDIP.
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After studying the structure of malicious infrastructure networks, we investigate dif-
ferent measures to evaluate the importance of each domain in the network. In Table 4.7, we
present the group centrality values (calculated using Equation 4.3) for some of the malicious
infrastructure networks.
The degree centrality is considered as an estimator of the level of existence of Fast-
Flux domains in the network. For instance, the network DIP5 has a high degree centrality,
which conﬁrms the network structure properties indicating that this network is easy to be
disturbed by taking down the domains with high degree centrality .
Periodically, different malicious networks connect with each other and with some
domains to share information (e.g. exploits or infection modules). Betweenness centrality
helps uncover the domains that play a role in connecting different malicious networks. In
order to take down any network, good candidates to start with would be the domains that
have high betweenness centrality. An example of networks that contain more intermediate
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Figure 4.7: The nDCG@k evaluation measure values for degree and betweenness centrality
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Figure 4.8: The nDCG@k evaluation measure values for degree and betweenness centrality
measures for malicious infrastructure networks GDIP.
Since the centrality metrics quantiﬁes the importance of domains based on their rela-
tionships, we evaluate how these measures conﬁrm public knowledge about the malicious-
ness of these domains. Since these measures order the importance of domains, we correlate
them with graded maliciousness scores from the WOT reputation system [128]. The eval-
uation is judged by the nDCG measure explained in Section 2.1.3. In Figure 4.7, we show
the evaluation of all centrality measures to rank the top domains in the abused networks. On
a similar note, Figure 4.8 illustrates the evaluation of centrality for the malicious infrastruc-
ture networks. In both graphs, the degree centrality outperforms the betweenness centrality
because it relies on the frequencies of being used by malware communities or the level of
Fast-Flux activity. However, the betweenness centrality quantiﬁes only the importance of
the position of the domains in the network and does not determine the maliciousness of the
domains. From this observation, we learn that malware interaction with domains and IP
addresses shows promising indicators of domain involvement in malicious activities.
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4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a framework to extract and build intelligence from malware
dynamic analysis reports. The framework produces statistical insights that can be used in
the early stages of cyber crime investigations. Moreover, it analyzes the conﬁguration of
abused networks and quantiﬁes the relative importance of domain names. Our framework is
evaluated on two months’ feed of malware dynamic analysis reports, which contains an av-
erage of 6000 reports per day. Our evaluation reveals that studying the malware interaction
with domain names can lead to deeper insight into malicious activities.
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Chapter 5
Ranking the Severity of Domain Names
based on Malware Behavior
In this chapter, we study the problem of assigning severity scores to malicious domains,
i.e., domains that are abused by the malware underground community. Our main goal is to
automatically assign a high severity score to domains that are involved in severe malicious
activities, such as C&C servers and drop locations. The severity scores enable dynamic
domain name blacklists to be more efﬁcient in prioritizing how to deal with cyber crimes.
For example, with existing blacklists, it is unclear, which domain names have been involved
in more malicious activities compared to others. With dynamic severity scoring, our goal is
to determine the level of maliciousness for each domain name. We formulate the problem
using a system inspired by the emerging ﬁeld of reputation systems.
Our work is based on the observation that behaviors of malicious networks are re-
ﬂected in their interactions with domain names. In short, malware behavioral features have
distinct characteristics that reveal the nature of their malicious interaction with domain
names. By identifying and observing these features, our system can assign appropriate
severity scores to malicious domains with, which these malware interact. Our system uses
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dynamic malware analysis reports generated in a controlled environment from malware
samples provided by ThreatTrack Security Inc [124]. Through analysis of such reports, our
system assigns severity scores to existing and new domain names, thereby enriching the
blacklists with more information about malicious domain names and their behaviors.
Previous works, discussed in Section 2.2.3, mainly focus on (binary) reputations and
blacklisting of domain names. We can distinguish our proposed system from other repu-
tation studies [79, 80, 81] by the following key points: ﬁrst, our work proposes a novel
approach to evaluate the reputation score of a given domain name based on the malware
behavior analysis by quantifying and measuring the level of abuse. Second, our severity
system updates the severity scores based on observed malware behavior and requires no
training period. Third, our system beneﬁts from the ﬂexibility of generating customized
severity scores by adjusting the weights of the features based on the investigator’s priori-
ties. Finally, our system provides a behavioral pattern for domain names that can be used
to recognize domain name abuse activities.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Our system is described in Sec-
tion 5.1. Section 5.2 explains our dataset and Section 5.3 demonstrates the effectiveness of
our proposed system via an experiment involving real-world malware dynamic analysis re-
ports. We discuss the results and limitations of our work in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6
provides our concluding remarks.
5.1 Severity Ranking System
The goal of our system is to assign severity scores to abused domain names. For any
given domain name, a high severity score is assigned if the domain is involved in extensive
malicious activities, such as C&C servers and drop locations.
Our system uses malware dynamic analysis reports as a main source of information.
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These reports contain detailed information about domain names and their resolved IPs. For
each domain name, behavioral reports provide information concerning all communication
between a malware instance and domains through different protocols, such as HTTP, FTP,
IRC, and SMTP. Our dynamic malware analysis report database is updated on a daily basis
using a live feed of malware samples obtained from ThreatTrack Security Inc [124].
Malware Dynamic 
Analysis Reports



























Figure 5.1: Overview of the proposed severity ranking system.
5.1.1 System Overview
In reputation systems, the main goal is to collect and combine feedback about participants’
behavior. The participants convey their opinions according to a speciﬁc rating model that
results in an integrated rating vector for each participant. Given a set of domain names,
a rating value is associated with each domain name based on a set of malware behavioral
features over a given time period. The severity system differs from traditional reputation
systems in the collection of feedback. In contrast to the traditional reputation system based
on subjective opinions, the rating values in our approach are implicit values inferred from
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the interactions between domain names and malware samples.
Prior to discussing our proposed domain name severity system, we ﬁrst introduce
some basic notation. A malware sample m contacts a domain name d, represented by a set
of labels separated by dots.
Let D = {d1,d2, . . . ,dn} be a set of domain names, and M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mp} be the
set of analyzed malware samples. Given a domain name d, we deﬁne A(d) ⊂ M to be the
set of all malware samples that contacted d. We denote I(d) as the set of all IP addresses
resolved from d ∈ D.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A domain name d is a severe domain when there is evidence that d or I(d)
are associated with known malicious activities. The evidence of maliciousness is recog-
nized by the malware interaction with the domain d. The more evidence observed toward
d, the higher the severity considered.
As shown in Figure 5.1, the severity of a domain name d is determined by the fol-
lowing steps. First, we observe the most recent set A(d) of malware samples that contacted
d. Then, we aggregate the set I(d) for all IP addresses resolved from all possible domain
name labels. Subsequently, we measure four different groups of features for each domain d.
The ﬁrst group contains connection-based features, which quantify the number of connec-
tions that are made by the set A(d). The second group consists of download-based features,
which measure the level of download activities conducted by the set A(d). The third group
includes upload-based features to capture any information leakage conducted by A(d). The
last group contains C&C-based features to quantify the level of C&C activities.
Once the above sets of features are extracted, we feed them to the rating centers,
where they are transformed into a set of rating values for each domain name d. The severity
engine then takes the rating values for each domain name and assigns the severity score
accordingly. We now explain the details of features extraction and how the rating centers
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convert them to rating values, followed by how the severity engine computes the severity
score of domain names.
5.1.2 Features Extraction
Domain names are considered as pointers to various Internet services that can be abused by
malicious networks to operate various activities. Our features are inspired by the life cycle
of a typical botnet that begins with an ordinary infected machine. Normally, the infected
system ﬁrst launches malicious activities locally, followed by attempts to communicate with
the botnet infrastructure. The infected machine then updates itself with the latest malware
binaries. The acquired binaries instruct the infected system to communicate with the rest of
the botnet infrastructure. The infected system is typically directed to download the updates
through a variety of ﬁle transfer protocols FTP and HTTP. By utilizing the life cycle of
malicious networks, we can extract some useful features that measure the level of abuse
for the involved domains. In what follows, we explain the set of features extracted by our
system.
Connection-based Features
The initial phase of botnet infection involves calling home infrastructure. The connection-
based features describe the frequency of accessing a domain d by different malware sam-
ples. A large number of connections established by malware samples to a domain d implies
high involvement of the domain d in malicious activities. In order to measure the number
of visits to a domain d, we observe features that capture successful connections to different
services on the set I(d). During our feature extraction, we evaluated the number of FTP,




A crucial stage in every malicious network involves updating the modules or the functional-
ities of the malware. We use the download-based features to measure the process of updat-
ing information for the infected systems. A domain name is considered as a data provider
when it serves as a direct or an intermediate step to host data downloaded by a malware
sample. This set of features thus reﬂects the severity of being a data provider in malicious
networks. Given a domain name d, we extract the number of conducted downloads using
HTTP GET ( f5) and FTP RETR ( f6) operations.
Upload-based Features
Certain malicious networks collect information from victims for different purposes. Upload-
based features capture the existence of information leakage from infected hosts to domain
names. A domain name that receives stolen information from an infected machine is called
a drop location. By counting the number of HTTP POST ( f7) and FTP STOR ( f8) opera-
tions, we can measure the level of the domain’s participation in such activities.
C&C-based Features
C&C servers are considered as the nerve system of malicious networks. C&C-based fea-
tures reﬂect the existence of any instruction that is transmitted between infected hosts and
domain names. In our system, f9 counts the number of exchanged C&C commands using
the IRC protocol between malware samples and the domain under consideration.
5.1.3 Rating Centers
In reputation systems, feedback collected from raters reﬂects participant behaviors. In our
context, features (f1-f9) are fed to dedicated rating centers to generate rating values. For
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Figure 5.2: Rating center functionalities.
any given period of time, rating centers produce rating values that reﬂect how each domain
behaves according to the collected set of features as depicted in Figure 5.2. First, the rating
centers store an accumulation of the features for each domain name d. The rating centers
then sort all of the observed domain names in descending order based on the calculated
features. Finally, rating centers arrange domain names into different rating levels. Based
on Deﬁnition 5.1, these levels reﬂect the position of a domain name with respect to all
observed domain names based on considered features. The assigned level for a domain
name is considered as the inferred rating value, which can be used in the severity score
computation.
Rating Freshness. Domain names can change their involvement in malicious activities
from one day to another. The severity score should therefore reﬂect this behavior by pri-
oritizing attention to recent rating values. Rating values are usually aggregated by simple
vector addition over a pre-speciﬁed time interval. Previous rating values can be aged by a
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freshness factor λ ∈ [0,1] to give recent rating values more importance over the old ones.
When λ has low value, the old ratings have less inﬂuence on the severity scores, and vice
versa. Let rd,t be the aggregated rating values at time t; we then deﬁne the accumulated
rating values with the freshness value λ at the time t+1:
rd,(t+1) = λ .rd,t +rd,(t+1), where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. (5.1)
5.1.4 Severity Engine
The severity engine is responsible for determining the maliciousness level of a given do-
main. To accomplish this goal, the severity engine receives rating values from designated
rating centers based on the malware features. Our goal is to derive a severity function that
satisﬁes the following design criteria: ﬁrst, the severity function should be dynamic and
updated over time. Second, the severity function should give more attention to the recent
rating values over the old ones. Third, the severity function should be customizable to serve
the purpose of a cyber crime investigation process.
Our severity engine uses Multinomial Bayesian systems (Dirichlet reputation sys-
tems) [129]. Dirichlet reputation systems provide a strong and sound mathematical model
for addressing our design criteria. It also allows for multinomial rating levels that are used
to represent feedback about domain names. Let L = {l1, . . . , lq} denote the set of possible
q rating levels. A domain name d receives a rating value rcd ∈ L from each of the four rat-
ing centers c as shown in Figure 5.2. Let rcd = (rd(1),rd(2), . . . ,rd(q)) denote the rating of
center c corresponding to domain d, where rd(i) = 1 if the rating level i is chosen by c and
rd(i) = 0 otherwise.
Since the extracted features constitute the source of the rating values, we can place
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emphasis on a subset of the features for our severity score calculations. Let wc be a weight-
ing factor that reﬂects the investigator’s interest in each set of features. The accumulated




Deﬁnition 5.2 (Severity Score Vector). The severity score vector Sd of a domain d with






, i= 1 . . .q
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(5.3)
The updated (posterior) severity score is initialized using an a priori severity score
(αd) to reﬂect previous expert knowledge about each domain name. The new rating values
(Rd) update the score based on the extracted features. C denotes a priori constant that weighs
the importance of considering previous information about domain names while updating the
new score. When a large value of C is chosen, new ratings have less impact on the current
scores.
Equation 5.3 represents the severity score in q different probability values for each
lq ∈ L. In order to represent the severity score with a single value for concise represen-
tation [55], we assume a given rating level li has point value that reﬂects its importance
between the other levels V = (v(l1),v(l2), . . . ,v(lq)), where v(li) = i−1q−1 . The severity score






Since the severity system is based on updating a priori information, each fresh domain
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name d has to be initialized with a score that is deﬁned by the common base rate vector α .
The base rate injects the a priori knowledge about domain names. When the system is
bootstrapped, a default base rate αq = 1q is used.
The base rate vector can be updated dynamically based on the severity scores ob-
served by all domain names. This vector reﬂects certain information about a domain name
with additional bias to either low or high severity scores. To calculate the dynamic base




We can then calculate the dynamic base rate for time period t+1 using Equation 5.3.
To explain the proposed approach, assume that we have 10 domains for which to
evaluate their severity throughout the ﬁrst two days as shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2.
We initialize the system by setting q = 5, C = 5, α = 1 with dynamic base rate, λ = 0.5,
and wc = 1.
In the ﬁrst day, d6, d5, d3, and d6 are the most abused by malware samples to con-
duct download, upload, C&C, and successful connection activities respectively. Given the
features for the observed domains, rating values are inferred based on a scale of ﬁve levels,
where l5 denotes the most abused level. For example, the domain d1 conducted low (l1)
download activities, medium-low upload and successful connection activities, and medium
C&C activities. Each rating level has an individual score value that is calculated by Equa-
tion 5.3. Finally, the score estimation (Sd) is computed by Equation 5.4, which is used to
produce the ranked list of domain names. In fact, the domains d5, d6, and d4 occupy the
top three positions in the ﬁrst day. As we monitor the domains throughout the second day,
d3 has become inactive and a new domain (d11) is observed. The newly observed domain
(d11) integrated into the system by taking the community base rate while receiving current
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rating values, which qualify it to be in the 6th position. On the other hand, d3 has been
penalized for being inactive, which is reﬂected by discounting the scores with λ . Due to
the drop in activity of the d5 domain, it has been downgraded to second place in the ranked
list; since d6 continues to receive more high rating values, it qualiﬁes to be at the top of
abused domains.
Features Rating Score
Domains Fdown Fup Fc&c Fconn l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 Sd Rank
d1 10 20 10 50 1 2 1 0 0 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.39 5
d2 3 1 5 10 3 1 0 0 0 0.44 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.31 7
d3 5 8 21 30 2 1 0 0 1 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.42 4
d4 56 32 1 98 1 0 0 3 0 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.44 0.11 0.53 3
d5 34 52 13 130 0 0 1 1 2 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.64 1
d6 73 34 5 150 0 1 0 1 2 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.61 2
d7 2 4 5 30 2 2 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.33 6
d8 32 4 6 50 1 2 1 0 0 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.39 5
d9 2 4 6 29 3 1 0 0 0 0.44 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.31 7
d10 4 4 4 25 4 0 0 0 0 0.56 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.28 8
Table 5.1: Running example of ranking the severity of domain names: ﬁrst day.
Features Rating Score
Domains Fdown Fup Fc&c Fconn l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 Sd Rank
d1 3 16 2 22 3 0 1 0 0 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.27 8
d2 9 5 9 26 3 0 1 0 0 0.61 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.2 10
d3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.167 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.21 9
d4 90 20 8 140 0 0 2 1 1 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.43 0.14 0.6 3
d5 20 40 10 110 0 1 2 0 1 0.05 0.14 0.33 0.15 0.33 0.64 2
d6 65 40 10 190 0 0 1 1 2 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.24 0.42 0.71 1
d7 10 30 9 50 1 1 1 1 0 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.31 5
d8 20 29 15 80 0 1 1 1 1 0.15 0.33 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.45 4
d9 10 12 16 59 1 2 0 0 1 0.43 0.33 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.29 7
d10 7 9 1 20 3 1 0 0 0 0.71 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 11
d11 2 4 17 30 3 0 0 0 1 0.56 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.3 6
Table 5.2: Running example of ranking the severity of domain names: second day.
5.2 Data Collection and Analysis
The basic source of data for our dynamic severity system is the malware dynamic analysis
reports provided by ThreatTrack Security Inc [124]. Each report summarizes all of the
behavioral activities conducted by a single malware sample in a controlled environment.
The reported behavioral activities cover the system level and the network interactions. We
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analyzed an average of 6,000 distinct reports of different malware families on a daily basis
as shown in Figure 5.3. Our database collected over 14 million unique reports during the





















Figure 5.3: Number of analyzed malware samples.
By simple measurement of our dataset, we leverage important insights from our se-
lected behavioral features. During our experiments, malware samples contacted between
200 to 1,000 unique domain names per day, which accumulated to roughly 132,000 do-
mains with an average of 11% new domains per day as depicted in Figure 5.4. Since ma-
licious networks are recycling domain names, it is necessary to monitor and observe their
actions on a daily basis to limit and minimize domain recycling.
Reusing domain names in malicious activities does not prevent the use of fresh or
new domains that appear for short periods of time. Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of
active days for observed domains.
Figure 5.6 shows that domain names are mostly contacted by malicious networks to
download updates to infected machines after successful connection. Leaking information


















Active Domains New Domains
Figure 5.4: Number of observed and new domain names.
5.3 Domain Name Severity System Evaluation
In this section, we present an evaluation of the domain name severity system. We show
how the system tracks the behavior of domain names and assigns dynamic severity scores
based on the interactions of the domains with malware samples. Reputation systems are
evaluated based on existing or known maliciousness judgments. In our case, we must build
common knowledge about domain names from existing reputation solutions to represent
the maliciousness judgments. Web of Trust (WOT) [128] is a community-based safe surﬁng
tool and is considered as one of the most popular reputation systems, which assigns scores
to domain names based on user complaints and sources of blacklists. Domain names are
rated based on a scale between [0-100]. WOT scores represent users’ preferences and their
perceptions about domain names. Such scores also give a graded reputation that reﬂects the
level of abuse of domain names, which can be used to judge the maliciousness of domains
under consideration.
















Figure 5.5: Distribution of the number of observed domains according to the number of
active days.
by contrasting the obtained scores with the WOT scores. Second, we explore different
factors that can affect the system, such as the domain age, features customization, and
the domain’s behavioral patterns. Finally, we investigate the level of maliciousness inside
popular top ranked domain names.
5.3.1 Effectiveness of Domain Name Severity
The effectiveness performance of our severity system is evaluated using known malicious-
ness judgments from the WOT reputation system [128]. Since the WOT maliciousness
indicators are represented in a non-binary notion, one evaluation measure that can be prop-
erly used to measure the effectiveness of our system is the nDCG, which is described in
Section 2.1.3.
We experiment with a dataset that spans the period of January 1st , 2013 to November
16th, 2013. The system calculates the severity scores for each domain name as described























Figure 5.6: The average distribution of the extracted features.
nDCG values for the top 10 ranked domain names of each day are shown in Figure 5.7.
The average and variance values of nDCG over the observed interval are 0.72 and 0.0079
respectively. In Figure 5.8, we show the average nDCG@k of the system for different values
of k. Since the behavioral features capture domain name abuse from different perspectives,
we evaluate the domain name severity system based on different combinations of these


























































C: Connections, D: Downloads, U: Uploads,  I: C&C 
Figure 5.9: The nDCG@10 with different combinations of rating centers.
When a domain name under consideration is not found in the WOT list, we set the
mal j value in Equation 2.2 to zero. In Figure 5.10, we show the percentage of domains
that were not found in the WOT list in the 30 top-ranked domains. We investigate all of the
missing domains to search for clear justiﬁcation for the appearances of these domains within
the top ranked domains. Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of the behavioral features that
are conducted by the domains with no judgments in WOT. Most of these domains fall under
C&C activities. Since the WOT is based on user complaints, IRC domains are less likely
to be rated by end-users for two possible reasons: one, IRC domains are usually perceived
by end-user as harmless; two, there is no direct communication between these domains and
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Figure 5.11: Distribution of behavioral features for domains with no maliciousness judg-
ments in WOT.
The domain name severity system depends on the period and the freshness of an
abuse. Domain severity scores are discounted based on their age of being abused by the
malware community. Short-lived domains, which appear for less than 10 days, represent a
large portion of the abused domains as discussed in Section 5.2. The severity system can
be conﬁgured accordingly to focus on the fresh domains by adjusting the age weights (λ )
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in Equation 5.2. Figure 5.12 shows the average nDCG of the system with different values
of the age discount factor. When the system uses the age discount factor, it can adjust the
importance or the level of contribution of past events to the current severity score. It is
clear that the performance dropped in the absence of the age factor discount (λ = 1), which
shows the importance of taking into consideration how long a domain name is abused. In
contrast, the system performs better when the age discount factor is set to ignore past scores
(λ = 0), which considers only the fresh domain names or the current day rating values. Our
















Age Discount (λ) 
Figure 5.12: Variation of nDCG@10 with λ .
Initially, the scores of fresh domain names are initiated by adjusting the system base
rate conﬁgurations. The base rate (α) can be initiated by previous expert knowledge, which
can affect the evolution of severity calculation. Figure 5.13 shows variation in the average
nDCG@10 with different conﬁgurations of the base rate α . When the system is conﬁgured
to dynamically calculate the base rate from the existing community, the initial knowledge
does not have any effect on the performance. However, when the system uses a ﬁxed base
rate, the initial knowledge negatively affects the performance.
To evaluate our system in assigning high severity scores to malicious domains, we
collected domains listed by various sources of public blacklists [130, 131, 132]. We then






















Figure 5.13: Base rate selection and nDCG@10.
the top 1,000 severe domains on the last day of our analysis. Figure 5.14 shows that our
system successfully assigns high severity scores to the blacklisted domains, and also reﬂects





















Non-Blacklisted Blacklisted α 
Figure 5.14: Severity score distribution for blacklisted and non-blacklisted domains.
Previous studies observed some abuse within popular domains. It is thus necessary
to quantify the level of abuse within top ranked popular domain names [133]. Since our
domain name severity system measures the level of maliciousness, this allows us to infer
the abuse level of popular domain names. During our experiments, we examined the top
200 domains reported on a daily basis from our severity system to analyze the level of abuse
within public lists of popular domains represented by Alexa [134] and Quantcast [135] lists.
Figure 5.15 shows the daily percentage of the existence of popular domains within our
daily severe domains lists. Among the top 200 severe domains observed from our analysis,
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32% and 21% of these domains were found in Alexa and Quantcast, respectively. We also
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Figure 5.15: Abuse of the malware community in popular domains lists.
5.4 Ranking the Severity of Name Servers from Passive
DNS
DNS has been abused by cyber criminals with techniques that require more control over
name servers in order to be implemented effectively. In this section, we look at the root
cause of managing malicious domain names. We extend the severity system developed
throughout this chapter to assign severity scores to name servers. However, we leverage the
passive DNS trafﬁc to infer the malicious behavior of the name server. Our main goal is to
assign a high severity score to name servers involved in malicious activities. The severity
scores help in identifying rogue name servers, which are abused by malicious networks to
conduct various activities. Given a name server ns, we assign a high severity score if ns is
involved in malicious activities, such as hosting short-lived domains, Fast-Flux domains, or
DGA domains. On the contrary, we want to assign a low severity score if ns is used mainly
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for legitimate purposes. With dynamic severity scoring, our goal is to decide the level of
maliciousness for each name server.
Previous works, discussed in Section 2.2.3, focused mainly on reputations and black-
listing of domain names; however, we focus on the root causes by designing a reputation
system for name servers instead of domains. To the best of our knowledge, our system is
the ﬁrst to create a dynamic reputation around name servers.
Our work is based on the observation that name server behaviors are reﬂected on the
domain names under their authority. In short, domain name features have certain charac-
teristics that can reveal the nature of the malicious activities operated on a speciﬁc name
server. By identifying and observing the domains under an authoritative name server, our
system can assign appropriate severity scores for that name server. The severity of a name
server ns is determined by the following steps:
1. We observe the most recent set R(ns) of domain names that reports ns as an authori-
tative name server.
2. We aggregate the set S(d) of all observed sub-domains under d.
3. We measure two different groups of statistical features for each domain d, namely
Fast-Flux-based features and DGA-based features groups.
4. The calculated features feed to the rating centers to generate rating values, which are
processed by the severity engine to produce severity scores.
Once the statistical features are extracted, the rating center transforms the statistical
features into a set of rating values for each name server ns. The severity engine then takes
the rating values for each name server and assigns the severity score accordingly. In the
following, we explain the details about the statistical features. Afterward, the rating centers
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discussed in Section 5.1.3 are used to convert the features to rating values, and the severity
engine explained in Section 5.1.4 is used to compute the name server’s severity score.
5.4.1 Name Server Statistical Features
In this section, we explain the statistical features used in our name server severity system.
Name servers play a crucial role in the DNS infrastructure by holding resource records for
domain names. Recent abuse of DNS requires more control over name servers in order
to be implemented effectively, such as Fast-Flux domains and DGA domains. Malicious
networks abuse name servers to hold and operate their domains. The statistical features
are inspired by the domain’s abuse characteristics that are discussed in previous works [80,
89, 26, 87]. Our features focus on the abuse of DNS that requires more control over name
servers. For instance, the Fast-Flux and DGA techniques are considered the most used
techniques for name server abuse. Such abuse requires frequent updates to the resource
records of the abused domains and more control over name servers as well. By observing
the Fast-Flux and DGA abuse, we can extract a few of the statistical features that measure
the level of abusiveness for the name server ns by malicious networks.
Fast-Flux Features
Since malicious networks are constructed mainly on top of compromised machines, bot-
masters need techniques to utilize these machines in order to operate malicious activities.
Botmasters have recently developed several ways to make malicious networks more ﬂex-
ible and robust against take down actions, e.g., by using Fast-Flux techniques. Criminals
introduce FFSNs, which simply host a service by many different IP addresses; i.e., they
construct a proxy network on top of compromised machines that are used to build resilient
hosting infrastructure using public DNS [23]. Generally, FFSNs can be classiﬁed either as
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single Fast-Flux or as double Fast-Flux. The single Fast-Flux technique frequently changes
the mapping of A records [88] of domain names to IP addresses of compromised systems in
the botnet. The double Fast-Flux technique is similar to the single Fast-Flux but it has an ad-
ditional layer of redundancy that continually changes the authoritative NS records [88, 23].
The Fast-Flux features report some characteristics of domain names that are abused
by Single-Flux or Double-Flux techniques. Table 5.3 summarizes the features that are used
in the literature to capture the behavior of Fast-Flux domain names and provide promising
results in recognizing such abuse [87, 89]. Fast-Flux is used to manage many IP addresses
to host a speciﬁc domain name. Therefore, the number of distinct IP addresses is one of the
important signs of Fast-Flux behavior. We measure the existence of multiple IP addresses
for a given domain and name server by counting the number of unique A records associated
with that domain and name server ( f1, f2). Fast-Flux behavior can also be recognized by the
TTL values for resource records. Since Fast-Flux techniques need to shufﬂe IP addresses
for domain and name servers in short periods, the TTL values of A and NS records are
typically conﬁgured with low values. By setting low TTL values, DNS forces resolvers to
drop the corresponding cached resource records quickly [89]. This causes new resource
records to be fetched from the authoritative name server more frequently. Our features
include the average TTL values for the observed A and NS records ( f3, f4) of a speciﬁc
domain.
DGA-based Features
When an infected machine must communicate with its home infrastructure, it usually con-
tacts either some of the hard coded IP addresses or the domain names. This static contact
information could be blacklisted and cause the infected machine to be isolated from reach-
ing home. Cyber criminals overcome this challenge by introducing the DGA technique to
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generate domains dynamically using predeﬁned algorithms. By utilizing some of these do-
mains, an infected machine has greater chances to more effectively interact with malicious
networks.
The DGA-based features capture the existence of the DGA behavior reﬂected on
DNS messages. Table 5.3 lists some of the features that were introduced in previous studies
to detect DGA domains [80]. DGA domain names are usually generated from random
characters or non-meaningful words. Based on these two observations, we utilize four
features that can detect DGA domains. The ﬁrst feature is to measure the randomness of
the characters within the 2LD ( f5) using Shannon’s entropy [26]. The second feature is to
estimate the meaningfulness of domains ( f6) by extracting the Longest Meaningful String
(LMS) using the Wordnet database 1. The last two features evaluate the ratio of digits ( f7)
and the number of unique characters ( f8) within the 2LD.
Feature Type Features
Fast-Flux
( f1) Number of unique A records
( f2) Number of unique A records for name servers
( f3) Average TTL value for A records
( f4) Average TTL value for NS records
DGA
( f5) Entropy of the 2LD
( f6) Ratio of LMS to the length of the 2LD
( f7) Ratio of digits to the length of the 2LD
( f8) Number of unique characters in the 2LD
Table 5.3: Fast-Flux and DGA features.
5.5 Discussion and Limitations
Existing reputation systems produce a binary decision (Good or Bad) about domain names.
We believe that our domain name severity system can serve as an extension to existing
reputation systems such as Notos and EXPOSURE. Normally, reputation systems produce
1http://wordnet.princeton.edu
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a large number of domain names to be blacklisted. Given a list of blacklisted or even
regular domain names, our system can add more information about the level of abuse for
these domains. Moreover, our system is based on behavioral features, which can easily be
extended by adding new features to capture other behaviors of malicious actions such as
spam, phishing, and other C&C communications.
Our experiments show a noticeable level of abuse for known good domains repre-
sented by Alexa and Quantcast lists. Such abuse raises an alarm against whitelists, which
can be abused to deliver and participate in malicious activities. Since our severity sys-
tem is based on the second level domain, the severity scores represent the collective abuse
conducted under each second level domain. The malware community has recently started
abusing cloud services to host malicious contents. In our analysis, we observed three major
cloud service providers that were listed among the top 300 severe domains rated by our sys-
tem. These domains have 665 different sites that were abused by the malware community.
Current studies focus on the abuse level of domain names, whereas our work serves
as a base for future behavior analysis of name servers. Our name server severity system can
complement the exiting domain name reputation systems to discover and effectively take
down malicious networks. The recognition of abuse types can be adjusted by the statistical
features, which can easily be extended by adding new features to capture other behaviors
of malicious actions.
We are aware that our system does have certain limitations. First, the abuse level rank-
ing is limited to the domain names observed during the dynamic analysis of the malware
samples. This limitation is inherited from the nature of malware dynamic analysis, which
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can be affected by different factors such as analysis time and anti-sandbox techniques. Sec-
ond, the behavioral features consider all communication between domain names and mal-
ware samples as malicious. However, there are some activities that can be considered as be-
nign, such as regular or legitimate software updates by the sandbox environment. Recently,
some approaches have been introduced to detect malicious downloaded ﬁles [136, 67, 137].
Such techniques can be used to evaluate the reputation of the downloaded ﬁles in order to
improve the quality of the feature extraction by our system. In the case of the name server
severity system, the abuse level ranking is limited to the name servers observed by the DNS
sensors. This limitation is inherited from the nature of passive DNS monitoring, which can
only listen to name servers that reside in their premises. In addition, the statistical features
might capture some of the legitimate services (Fast-Flux). Certain learning algorithms can
be adopted to set some thresholds to recognized such legitimate services [87, 89].
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a severity system for domain names based on dynamic anal-
ysis reports of malware samples. The system leverages the interaction between domain
names and malware samples to extract indicators for malicious behaviors or abuse actions.
The system utilizes these behavioral features on a daily basis to dynamically produce sever-
ity or abuse scores for domain names. Since our system assigns maliciousness scores that
describe the level of abuse for each analyzed domain name, it can be considered as a com-
plementary component to existing (binary) reputation systems, which produce long lists
with no priorities. Our system leverages the domain names that reside under the authority
of name servers to extract indicators for malicious behaviors or abuse actions. The system
utilizes these behavioral features to dynamically produce severity or abuse scores for name
servers.
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Our evaluation using real-world data, including a 10-month dynamic analysis report,
shows that the list produced by our system highly correlates with those produced by the
well-known Web Of Trust (WOT) reputation system. Moreover, our system allows us to




Detection of DNS-based Malicious
Payload Distribution Channels
In this chapter, we propose a detection mechanism for DNS payload distribution channels
by leveraging features of DNS to distinguish between malicious and non-malicious do-
mains. We use this mechanism to analyze a signiﬁcant amount of DNS trafﬁc in order to
understand the extent of DNS abuse in the real world. We detected a few previously un-
known long-lasting malware domains and different types of payload distribution channels.
This result is signiﬁcant considering that the use of DNS payload distribution channels by
malicious networks is relatively rarely exploited. Our proposed technique, which is based
on access counts of resource records, shows promising results regardless of the syntax for-
mats of payload distribution channels.
This chapter is organized as follows. Our system is described in Section 6.1. Section
6.2 explains our datasets and Section 6.3 demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposal via
an experiment on near real-time trafﬁc. We discuss the limitations of our work in Section


























Figure 6.1: Overview of proposed approach.
6.1 Proposed Approach
Our system monitors DNS messages in passive DNS and then characterizes and detects
payload distribution channels established within these DNS messages. As shown in Figure
6.1, the system consists of two main modules, one for query and response pattern analysis
and a second for the detection of payload distribution. Initially, the system pre-processes the
passive DNS trafﬁc by extracting DNS messages that have TXT resource record activities
and divides the captured DNS trafﬁc stream into speciﬁc epochs (e.g., epoch = 1 day). For
each epoch, it aggregates the DNS query and response messages of a given domain name to
be added to the domain-based queue. In parallel, the passive DNS trafﬁc is also stored in a
passive DNS database, which collects historical data about DNS messages for ofﬂine anal-
ysis. Following the pre-processing phase, the collected messages are fed to the query and
response pattern analysis module, which provides characteristics of the payload distribution
channels. Finally, the detection module identiﬁes the payload distribution channels. In the
following section, we provide details on how to characterize and detect payload distribution
channels.
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6.1.1 Query and Response Patterns
DNS protocol is based on query and response messages to manage domain name sys-
tems. A query from any client can be formed to retrieve different information from a name
server, which will respond accordingly. By observing the communication between client
and server, we can model the relation between query and response messages. The query
and response relations can be used to distinguish between different behaviors of payload
distribution. When we observe any payload distribution activity, we use three parameters to
establish the channels in DNS. These parameters are the second-level domain, sub-domain,
and TXT record. The second-level domain is used to carry out payload distribution activ-
ity. The sub-domain is used to transfer any information from the client to the server. The
TXT record is the response information from the server to the client. During any session, the
client and the server agree on a speciﬁc domain name to be used for the payload distribution
activity. The second level domain parameter is thus determined before any session. We are
then left with two parameters that are used to form the communication channel. Based on
the nature of the payload distribution channel, these two parameters have different behav-
iors. The aim of the query and response pattern analysis module is to differentiate between
different behaviors of payload distribution. To achieve this goal, we analyze the exchange
behavior of query and response messages. This module is built based on two observations:
ﬁrst, payload distribution channels through DNS are forced to transfer small quantities of
information with each DNS message due to the fact that DNS response packets are limited
to 512 bytes of characters if Extension mechanisms for DNS (EDNS) is not used [138].
Second, transferring more information through DNS protocol results in a high rate of DNS
queries and responses between the client and the name server [29].
Figure 6.2 illustrates different payload distribution scenarios that are considered the
four main possible behaviors of the two payload distribution parameters as sub-domains
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and TXT records. Figure 6.2a explains how the client is changing the sub-domains to send
data to the name server, which will respond with the corresponding TXT records for each
sub-domain (Many-to-Many relation). Figure 6.2b shows how the client is changing the
sub-domains to update the name server with its status, and the server is replying with the
same TXT record for all possible sub-domains (Many-to-Single relation). Figure 6.2c ex-
plains how the client is sending the same sub-domain answered by several TXT records from
the server (Single-to-Many relation). This case rarely occurs within a short time frame be-
cause these responses are cached by caching resolvers for a period of time (TTL). Figure
6.2d shows how the client is sending the same sub-domain answered by only one TXT
record from the server (Single-to-Single relation). In general, malware families retrieve
updates from a malicious infrastructure in three different approaches: full payload updates



























Figure 6.2: Examples of query and response exchange patterns.
Deﬁnition 6.1. The query-response pattern model is a tuple G= 〈{d}∪T ∪S,E〉, where:
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• d is the domain name node,
• S = {s1,s2, · · · ,sm} is a ﬁnite set of sub-domain nodes,
• T = {t1, t2, · · · , tk} is a ﬁnite set of TXT record nodes,
• E ⊆ (D×S)∪ (S×T ) is a ﬁnite set of pairs of distinct nodes, called edges.
We model the query and response relationship for each domain using a directed graph
as captured by Deﬁnition 6.1. For each vertex v in G, we deﬁne two functions: the in-
degree of v, denoted by inDegree(v), returns the number of entering edges to the node v:
inDegree(v) = |{u ∈V | (u,v) ∈ E}|; and the out-degree of v, denoted by outD(v), returns
the number of leaving edges from the node v: outDegree(v) = |{u ∈V | (v,u) ∈ E}|.
As shown in Figure 6.2, the query and response relationship patterns share certain
properties as given by Property 6.1.
Property 6.1. inDegree(d) = 0, outDegree(tk) = 0, outDegree(d) = inDegree(sm), and
outDegree(sm) = inDegree(tk)
In order to distinguish between the patterns shown in Figure 6.2, we deﬁne the nor-






Since the query and response patterns can form complex relationships, we limited our sys-
tem to recognize only one pattern for each domain. We must therefore choose a candidate
node to represent the set. In fact, the system selects the most commonly used node de-
gree inside the targeted set. Let t ∈ T , and s ∈ S, each query and response pattern can be
recognized by the following properties:
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Property 6.2. Given that inDegree(t) is the common value in inDegree(T ), then the Many-
to-Many pattern holds when Dist(outDegree(d), inDegree(t)) ≥ 0.5 and Dist(|S|, |T |) <
0.5.
Property 6.3. Given that inDegree(t) is the common value in inDegree(T ), then the Many-
to-Single pattern holds when Dist(outDegree(d), inDegree(t)) < 0.5 and Dist(|S|, |T |) ≥
0.5.
Property 6.4. Given that inDegree(t) is the common value in inDegree(T ) and outDegree(s)
is the common value in outDegree(S), then the Single-to-Many pattern holds when
Dist(outDegree(s), inDegree(t))≥ 0.5 and Dist(|S|, |T |)≥ 0.5.
Property 6.5. Given that inDegree(t) is the common value in inDegree(T ) and outDegree(s)
is the common value in outDegree(S), then the Single-to-Single pattern holds when
Dist(outDegree(s), inDegree(t))< 0.5, Dist(outDegree(d), inDegree(t))< 0.5, and
Dist(|S|, |T |)< 0.5.
Algorithm 18 displays an overview of query and response pattern recognition in four
steps. Step 1 (Line 1) takes a snapshot from the passive DNS trafﬁc for a pre-deﬁned
window of time. This step produces a set of query and response messages for each domain
that appears within the targeted window. Step 2 (Line 3) processes every domain name
by constructing the relation graph between sub-domains and TXT records. Step 3 (Lines
4-6) calculates the out-degree vector for all sub-domains, the in-degree vector for all TXT
records, and the out-degree of the domain. From these vectors, we get the commonly used
degree, which is considered a strong representative for the relation between all nodes. Step
4 (Lines 7-9) counts the distinct values of sub-domains and TXT records. Step 5 (Lines
10-17) determines the pattern mode based on the properties of each pattern, which can be
applied in arbitrary order (Property 6.2-6.5).
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Algorithm 1: EXTRACTQUERYRESPONSEPATTERN
Input: A domain name d, set of sub-domains S = 〈s1,s2, . . . ,sn〉, set of TXT
records T = 〈t1, t2, . . . , tm〉
Output: Query and Response pattern mode,
{Many_Many,Many_Single,Single_Single}
1 D← getSnapshoptFrom_pDNS(w)





7 SubDomains_Counter ← |S|
8 TXT_Counter ← |T |
9 Pattern_Mode= None
10 if Property 6.5 then
11 Pattern_Mode= Single_Single
12 if Property 6.2 then
13 Pattern_Mode=Many_Many
14 if Property 6.3 then
15 Pattern_Mode=Many_Single




6.1.2 Detection of Payload Distribution Channels
Each DNS message has a domain name d that consists of a set of labels. The rightmost label
is called the top-level domain; the two rightmost labels are called second-level domain; the
rest of the labels are referred to in the same manner. The services provided by these labels
are represented in a zone ﬁle and stored in the corresponding authoritative name server.
Name servers are capable of handling any DNS query and returning the corresponding
responses, which are taken from the zone ﬁle of each domain name. As name servers
are the key players in DNS, malicious networks must have access to a name server for
managing the payload distribution. When a name server is appointed to be the authoritative
name server for a malicious domain name, botmasters prepare the zone ﬁle of the domain to
store all attack payloads to be delivered via DNS. Since DNS zone ﬁles reﬂect the provided
services of domain names, we decided to observe DNS zone ﬁles to analyze domain name
behavior.
Extraction of DNS Zones: In payload distribution channels through DNS, name servers
are considered as the payload distributors. Since domain names can have multiple zones,
we must recognize the responsible zones that are associated with payload distribution.
Since a domain might have multiple labels that point to different zones, the system
traverses the labels from second-level to the left-most label. For each label, the NS resource
record is requested from the passive DNS database to see whether or not that label is a zone.
If a sub-domain label has an NS record, it is a zone under that second-level domain. In the
next step, the system proﬁles DNS zone activities of this zone.
DNS Zone Analysis: First, we analyze the behavior of domain names by observing DNS
zone activities in the passive DNS trafﬁc. Within the zone ﬁle of each domain name, there
are different types of resource records. Each resource record indicates speciﬁc services
or operations associated with the domain name. An important feature of the passive DNS
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database is the aggregation of the number of times each record has been requested, called
access count. Our intuition is that domain names, which are solely used for payload dis-
tribution, show different behavior compared to regular domains. Regular domains receive
queries for different resource records, whereas malicious domain names, which are mostly
used for payload distribution through DNS, are only accessed to receive attack payloads.
Botmasters therefore focus only on using speciﬁc resource records that are known to be
used in payload distribution channels such as TXT records. Moreover, these domains do
not heavily use the resource records that are normally used by regular domain names, such
as A, AAAA, and MX resource records. Thus, by observing the resource records and their
access counts, we can proﬁle the DNS zone activities of a domain name.
Determining whether a zone is used for payload distribution purposes can be achieved
by analyzing its resource record activities. These activities can be calculated as a function
of access counts. By using the passive DNS database, we extract all accessed resource
records and their access counts. The passive DNS is built in such a way that it counts the
amount of times of access to each resource record for a certain period.
Let R= RA∪RNS∪·· ·∪RTXT where RA = {rA | rA is an A record}, . . . ,RNS = {rNS |
rNS is an NS record} be the set of all resource record types that can be deﬁned in a DNS
zone ﬁle, and P = {p | p ∈ (R \RNS∪RCNAME)} is the set of all the resource record types
that are commonly used by payload distribution channels and other uses too. Since the TXT
resource record is known to be the most suitable for payload distribution, we deﬁne a set
T = {rTXT | rTXT is a TXT record} that holds any TXT record in a given zone.
Let the sum of access counts of all resource records in P be acP, and let the sum of








DNS messages ≈ 20 Billion
TXT records ≈ 40 Million
Malware database
Period 1 year
No. of samples ≈ 14 Million
No. of samples with TXT activities ≈ 18 Thousand
Table 6.1: Statistics of the dataset used to evaluate the proposed approach.
From Equation 6.2, μ reﬂects the relation between the access ratios of T and P records
and thus acts as an indicator of payload distribution activities. Payload distribution channels
receive signiﬁcant access counts from T , which results in larger μ values. However, non-
payload distribution channels receive more access counts on the resource records from P,
which hence results in smaller μ values.
Filtration Steps: Certain legitimate cases can behave as payload distribution channels. In
fact, there are speciﬁcations, which use TXT records to apply some security measures for
mail servers such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [139], Domain Keys Identiﬁed Mail
(DKIM) [140], Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [141], and DNS Black List (DNSBL) [142].
Since these speciﬁcations are designed for mail servers, a DNS zone ﬁle should reﬂect the
existence of MX resource records. These legitimate services can be recognized using two
different ﬁltration steps: speciﬁcations recognition (i.e., SPF, DKIM, IKE, or DNSBL) and
MX resource record activity. The ﬁrst ﬁltration process takes each domain and selects the
most accessed TXT resource record using the passive DNS database. We then apply a
regular expression in the TXT record based on the deﬁned syntax of speciﬁcations [140,
139, 141, 142] to determine any possible speciﬁcation string (e.g., SPF). When data from
the TXT record match any deﬁned speciﬁcations, we consider the domain name a non-
payload distribution channel. In the second ﬁltration step, we investigate the activities
of MX resource records. When a domain name is associated with MX resource record
activities, it is considered a non-payload distribution channel.
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6.2 Datasets Description
We utilize three datasets to evaluate our system: near real-time passive DNS trafﬁc, a pas-
sive DNS database, and a malware database.
Passive DNS Trafﬁc: We evaluate the system using a one-month passive DNS dataset,
which spans from March 19, 2013 to April 19, 2013, provided by Farsight Security Inc. [33].
We process only the packets with TXT responses. According to the system logs, the total
number of packets processed by our system is around 40 million packets with an average
of about 1.3 million packets daily (Table 6.1).
Passive DNS Database: Our system also builds a pDNS database that stores all the data
coming from the pDNS trafﬁc. This database recorded the pDNS trafﬁc that we utilize for
proﬁling the DNS zone of domains. The passive DNS database is provided by DNSDB of
Farsight Security Inc. [33].
Malware Database: We observe malware samples provided by ThreatTrack Security Inc [124]
over a one-year period. We receive the malware feed on a daily basis and then analyze each
sample in a sandbox to generate dynamic behavioral analysis reports. In our analysis, we
only consider malware samples that conduct activities using the TXT resource record. Table
6.1 shows statistics about the malware feed recorded between January 2012 and December
2012.
6.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we report the results of our experiments that we perform to test the effective-
ness of our system for detecting payload distribution channels in the passive DNS dataset.
We begin by demonstrating the results of the DNS zone analysis module using the passive
DNS dataset. Subsequently, we elaborate on the long-running hidden domains used by the
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Morto worm [14] to distribute attack payloads. Finally, we conclude the section by showing
that, contrary to common knowledge (e.g., [14]), some of the attack payloads are in clear-
text without any encoding or encryption. This indicates that our system can detect these
channels regardless of the syntax of the distributed data.
During our experiments, we processed domain names accessed for TXT records in
a time-based window, the length of which we set to one day. When the window expires,
the packets are fed to the DNS zone analysis module to build the DNS zone proﬁle of each
zone for detecting payload distribution channels.
Query and Response Patterns: In the ﬁrst step of our system, we determine the query
and response patterns of the captured DNS trafﬁc. To evaluate the effectiveness of each
pattern to carry out payload distribution channels, Figure 6.3 compares the average distinct
DNS messages with the number of malware instances per pattern as well as the number
of observed domains. The Many-to-Many pattern can be considered as the best candidate
for distributing large volumes of data while it was probed by a small number of malware
instances during the year of 2012. This extensive payload retrieval scheme would easily
alert the IDS [143]. On the other hand, the Single-to-Single pattern allows carrying small
volumes of data while maintaining a low network footprint. By observing our malware
samples, we discovered that most of the malware instances used this pattern to retrieve the
attack payloads as punctual updates. Since each of these instances sends a single query
to receive the attack payload, their queries can easily blend into the daily network traf-
ﬁc. Compared to other patterns, Single-to-Single is the best candidate to establish a fully
resilient channel in DNS. The Single-to-Many pattern requires updating the zone ﬁle to dis-
tribute different resource data for the same query. This is technically difﬁcult to maintain
because of the caching behavior of name servers. As we see in Figure 6.3, not a single mal-
ware instance uses this pattern. Although the Many-to-Single pattern has a single response
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to different queries like the Single-to-Single pattern, it creates a large number of queries








Query and response patterns 
Av. Distinct Messages Malware Instances Number of Domains
Figure 6.3: Average number of query and response messages within a one-day window.
Although the number of domains between all of the patterns is very close, there is a
distinct variation in the amount of generated trafﬁc as shown in Figure 6.3. The Many-to-
Many pattern is generating the most extensive trafﬁc compared to the other patterns. The
high volume of data exchange can reveal the name server used as payload provider. In
order to hide this name server, botmasters use it only for the bootstrapping phase to initiate
payload distribution channels. Malware samples are heavily using the Single-to-Single
pattern, which has the least amount of trafﬁc, as it makes them difﬁcult to be detected by
traditional defense mechanisms.
It is known that malware families are likely to share functionalities by utilizing com-
mon modules [144]. We observe the same behavior between different malware families
that share the same patterns in our evaluation. Figure 6.4 shows the query and response
pattern distribution across different malware families. The intersection between patterns
produces the number of malware families that share the same module. For example, there
are nine malware families utilizing Single-to-Single and Many-to-Single patterns. These
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samples use the Single-to-Single transfer pattern to contact the botmaster and receive a sin-
gle packet while using the Many-to-Single pattern to check for periodic updates. There are
also six malware samples that utilize a combination of all three patterns to establish more









Figure 6.4: Query and response pattern distribution for observed malware families.
DNS Zone Analysis: When the query and response messages of domains are captured, they
are inspected by the DNS zone analysis module. The access counts of each resource record
are gathered from the passive DNS database. Equation 6.2 determines the μ values of each
domain based on the access counts. During our experiments on the passive DNS trafﬁc,
we captured 2707 domains that have TXT resource record activities. Figure 6.5 shows the
distribution of domain names with different μ values. According to Equation 6.2, the bigger
the μ value, the more a domain name is involved in payload distribution.
Filtration: In Table 6.2, we show the number of detected domain names during the 30-day
period and the effect of each ﬁltration mechanism. 2707 domains are detected before any
ﬁltration is applied; however, some of these domains might be accessed mainly to receive


















Figure 6.5: Distribution of rating values of the 2707 detected domains.
Number of observed domains 2707
Domains with MX records 2506
Domains following known speciﬁcations 2613
Domains remaining after applying both ﬁltrations 37
Table 6.2: Statistics of detected domains within 30 days.
the number of domains to 37.
To validate the effectiveness of the ﬁltration process, we observe our malware dataset
and passive DNS database to investigate the difference between payload distribution chan-
nels and regular domains. As regular domains, we use the top 500 domains from Alexa
top sites. By using our one-year malware dataset, we extract malware domains used for
payload distribution. We retrieve the access counts for all resource records of each domain,
from regular as well as from malware domains. These access counts represent a good mea-
sure to understand the individual resource record activities of any given domain. Figure 6.6
provides the distribution of access counts for the considered types of resource records (A,
AAA, MX, NS, TXT, and CNAME). Domains from Alexa receive DNS queries for differ-



















Figure 6.6: Access counts of Alexa and malware domain DNS records.
utilize DNS for enabling access to different services. On the contrary, malware domains
receive an extensive number of DNS queries for TXT records. These records are used to
distribute the payload as they are the most suitable resource record type within the protocol.
We also investigate access to the CNAME records in malware domains. These are used to
redirect queries between malicious domains as botmasters maintain a network of malicious
payload distribution channels. On the other hand, malicious domains are not associated
with any MX resource records, which support the second ﬁltration process.
The ResilientMorto Domains: Morto is a malware family that targets the Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP) to gain access to host machines [14]. It is one of the malware families that
uses DNS as a payload distribution channel [14]. By utilizing the passive DNS database,
we detected domains used by the Morto family for more than 18 months with an average
to TXT records over four million times. Past work [14] has revealed that Morto receives
a Base64 encoded or encrypted URL, which points to the second payload. We noticed
that Morto domains also distribute IP addresses in clear-text inside TXT records. A re-
verse lookup of one of these IPs in the passive DNS database reveals that it is shared with
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other malicious domains. As previously mentioned, the malware authors also link together
different domains through CNAME records to maintain a malicious network.
Source No. of domains Avg. μ value
Devicescape [53] 12 0.998
Tunneling [145] 1 0.991
Morto [14] 3 0.994
Table 6.3: Detected payload distribution domains.
Detection Regardless of Syntax: As our method discovers the Morto domains, it also de-
tects the legitimate payload distribution channels as discussed in Section 2.1.2. It indicates
that regardless of the syntax of the payload distribution channel, the μ (access count) metric
is a strong feature to detect domains, which are used for these channels (Table 6.3). If bot-
masters start using a syntax similar to the legitimate services to blend into their trafﬁc, they
might not be detected by network monitors. However, our system may still detect them,
since the system monitors the DNS zone activities of payload distribution channels rather
than investigating their message syntax.
DNS Tunneling Detection: Our experiments reveal some DNS tunneling activities from
a single domain (a DNS Tunneling application for Android [145]). As our system is con-
ﬁgured to monitor TXT records, it successfully detects any DNS tunneling activities on
TXT records. If the tunnel is established by using another resource record type, we expect
that our system’s detection ability would remain intact, as the detection is not based on the
content of the resource record, but is rather based on the access counts of resource records.
In Table 6.3, we summarize our results with use cases and average μ values. After
applying both ﬁltrations, we are left with only a few domains per day, and can therefore
manually investigate their trafﬁc. The manual investigation resulted in 16 domain names
that are used as payload distribution channels. The remaining domains are used for trans-
mitting domain speciﬁc data in TXT records.
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6.4 Discussion and Limitations
During our observation of the malware dataset, we ﬁnd domain names that are used for
payload distribution channels. These malware samples use different methods to retrieve the
malicious content as discussed in Section 2.1.2. One of the interesting methods involves
the use of indexed queries to receive attack payload in multiple response packets. Due to
the size restriction on TXT resource records, the payload is chunked into parts, with each
part placed in another TXT record. Bots start querying this series of packets in a sequential
manner until the last packet is received. Some of these payloads are chunked into thousand
of packets. Surprisingly, this method is very similar to the patent from Trend Micro [52].
However, our results showed that this method is not seen in our passive DNS dataset. There
are two possible interpretations of the fact that this behavior is not observed in our recent
dataset: either botmasters realize the signiﬁcant exposure of using this mechanism, which
generates a large number of messages, and therefore decide to stop using it; or, these domain
names are directly resolved by their own name servers or other open resolvers, which are
not captured by passive DNS sensors.
The closest work to our proposed solution is the detection of DNS trafﬁc of a speciﬁc
malware family by applying features that are based on previously seen malicious trafﬁc
syntax [16]. Our solution uses another approach by investigating the DNS zone activities of
malicious domains. Even if malware changes the message syntax, the use of DNS remains
the same. Our method detects the malicious trafﬁc regardless of the syntax and malware
family.
The proposed solution can be used in real-time scenarios where there is access to the
DNS zone activities of domains. For example, it can be used by a domain name registrar
to detect registered domains used for payload distribution. In this case, the system can be
deployed on the authoritative name servers of the registrar so that it can observe the zone
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activities of domains.
Since each malware family can use different domains, it is possible that our system
assigns multiple pattern labels to a single malware family. As previously explained, certain
malware families utilize a bootstrapping technique to initiate the payload distribution chan-
nel and then use another domain name with a different exchange pattern. In this case, our
method will give two different labels to the same malware family.
Our current design includes the following limitations. First, there are domain names
that use TXT resource records for legitimate services along with other activities. Malware
can play the same role by operating different services on the same domain name. When a
domain is used for different malicious activities (i.e. spam, phishing) as well as for payload
distribution, it will be accessed for different resource records, e.g., A record for phishing
scam websites. Since our system makes use of the fact that name servers of payload distri-
bution channels receive requests mostly for TXT records, it might consider this domain a
non-payload distribution domain. Second, the passive DNS replication [50] is a unique way
to collect the global DNS trafﬁc by sensors. Unfortunately, it suffers from a shortcoming
that might affect our results. Malware might not use the caching resolver of a network, and
instead send queries directly to an open resolver. In this case, the trafﬁc would not pass
through the sensors that collect DNS trafﬁc, and would not be captured. However, this is
likely to remain a limitation in all solutions based on passive DNS datasets.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we shed light on the abuse of the DNS protocol by malware for distributing
attack payloads. We designed a system to characterize and detect the payload distribution
channels within passive DNS trafﬁc. Our system observes the DNS zone activities of a
channel by gathering access counts of each resource record type, and determines payload
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distribution channels. Our experiments on near real-time passive DNS trafﬁc show that
our system can detect several resilient malicious payload distribution channels, which were
active for more than 18 months. We found that most malware instances with DNS-based
payload distribution use a resilient pattern to retrieve their attack payloads, ostensibly to
blend in with regular network trafﬁc. Our system is also able to detect payload distribution
channels regardless of their syntax format. The evaluation of malware dynamic analysis
reports demonstrated that our method can determine payload distribution channel patterns
for different malware families.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Summary and Conclusion
With the rise in the number of malware samples reported by Anti-Virus companies on a
daily basis, security professionals should integrate methodologies to digest the extracted
intelligence from analyzing such a large number of malware instances. In this context, the
dynamic analysis of malware samples inside a closed environment is a promising approach
to understand and observe the behavior of malicious codes and networks. This approach
aims to extract information regarding an infected system and its network activities. Such
extracted information can be considered a ﬁrst step towards understanding malicious net-
works. To explore the abuse of malicious networks, we have elaborated some method-
ologies to extract intelligence, prioritize DNS abuse level, and detect payload distribution
channels through DNS.
For the intelligence extraction, we have introduced in Chapter 3 a detailed reverse
engineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit to unveil its underlying architecture
and enable its mitigation. Furthermore, we provided a breakdown for the structure of the
Zeus botnet network messages. Our analysis of the C&C communications indicates that
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the RC4 algorithm is used in a poor way to encrypt these communications (keystream
reuse). In addition to the knowledge of the network messages structure, we can launch
active countermeasures by interacting with the botnet servers using the extracted encryp-
tion key. Although the reverse engineering of malware samples generates valuable insights,
it is a tedious job that would be impractical to exercise on a daily basis. To keep up with the
increasing demand of analyzing malware samples, we have devised, in Chapter 4, a frame-
work to extract and build intelligence from the dynamic malware analysis reports. The
framework produces statistical insights that can be used in the early stages of cyber attack
investigations. Moreover, it identiﬁes the conﬁguration of any given network and quantiﬁes
the relative importance of individual network resources. The developed framework utilizes
the power of graph-based algorithms to explore relationships between malicious resources,
which are used to investigate the abused domains as well as the malicious infrastructure
network.
We have also designed and implemented, in Chapter 5, a severity system for domain
names based on dynamic analysis reports of malware samples. The system leverages the
interaction between domain names and malware samples to extract indicators for malicious
behaviors or abuse actions. The system utilizes these behavioral features to dynamically
produce severity or abuse scores for domain names on a daily basis. Since our system as-
signs maliciousness scores that describe the level of abuse for each analyzed domain name,
it can be considered as a complementary component to existing (binary) reputation systems,
which produce long lists with no priorities. Our evaluation using real-world data, includ-
ing a 10-month dynamic analysis report, shows that the list produced by our system highly
correlates with those produced by the well-known WOT reputation system. Moreover, our
system allows us to identify a noticeable level of abuse for known domains represented
by Alexa and Quantcast lists. Such abuse raises an alarm against whitelists which can be
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abused to deliver and participate in malicious activities. In our analysis, we observed no-
ticeable abuse for three major cloud service providers, which raises an alarm to implement
more policies around cloud services.
DNS has been recently abused by cyber criminals with techniques that require more
control over name servers in order to be implemented effectively. To this extent, we extend
the severity system to name servers based on DNS trafﬁc. The system leverages the domain
names that reside under the authority of name servers to extract indicators of malicious
behaviors or abuse actions. The system utilizes these behavioral features to dynamically
produce severity or abuse scores for name servers.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we shed light on the abuse of the DNS protocol by malware
for distributing attack payloads. We developed a system to characterize and detect the pay-
load distribution channels within passive DNS trafﬁc. Our system observes the DNS zone
activities of a channel by gathering access counts of each resource record type, and deter-
mines payload distribution channels. Our experiments on near real-time passive DNS trafﬁc
show that our system can detect several resilient malicious payload distribution channels,
which were active for more than 18 months. We found that most malware instances with
DNS-based payload distribution use a resilient pattern to retrieve their attack payloads, os-
tensibly to blend in with regular network trafﬁc. Our system is also able to detect payload
distribution channels regardless of their syntax format. The evaluation of malware dynamic
analysis reports demonstrated that our method can determine payload distribution channel
patterns for different malware families. The proposed solution can be used in real-time sce-
narios where there is access to the DNS zone activities of domains. For example, it can be
used by a domain name registrar to detect registered domains used for payload distribution.
In this case, the system can be deployed on the authoritative name servers of the registrar
so that it can observe the zone activities of domains. The rise of DNS protocol abuse to
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distribute attack payload information urges us to adjust the policies in order to regulate and
manage the use of DNS resource records.
7.2 Future Work
Much progress remains to be made in addressing the DNS abuse by the malware commu-
nity. In what follows, we suggest some research directions that can utilize both DNS trafﬁc
and malware analysis to address different challenges.
Take Down Optimization: Take down operations result in dismantling major criminal net-
works such as Rustock [146] and Citadel [147]. However, many argue over the effectiveness
of such take down operations [148]. Our analysis of malicious networks reveals the impor-
tance of some structural properties and domain names. One possible improvement would
be to evaluate the optimal selection of domains and IP addresses in order to efﬁciently
take down malicious infrastructure. The evidence of maliciousness extracted from malware
analysis and the volume of activities inferred from DNS trafﬁc can help develop sound tech-
niques for identifying effective ways to take down malicious infrastructures. This research
would be extremely valuable, both to the operational community and to law enforcement,
for making the best decisions against malicious networks.
Network Reputation: As demonstrated by this thesis, the severity system has been ex-
tended to evaluate the abuse level of name servers. Similarly, the severity could be applied
to evaluate networks such as ISP or hosting providers. When evaluating networks, there
are many challenges to take in consideration, such as the network size, malicious activities
duration and volume, and the type of threat. Such techniques shall provide network opera-
tors with the threat status of their networks and help in implementing corrective measures.
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Stone-Gross et al. [83] recently proposed a system to infer the reputation of networks us-
ing static blacklists, which can be extended by utilizing malware analysis and passive DNS
trafﬁc to build a comprehensive network reputation proﬁle.
Cloud Services Abuse: Due to the reliability and scalability of cloud based platforms,
cyber criminals have begun to abuse cloud services. Our study of the severity of domain
names can play an important role in quantifying the abuse of public services. For instance,
our evaluation demonstrates that cloud services are being abused by malicious activities.
In order to protect the reputation of the abused cloud services, more research is needed to
differentiate the pattern of abuse for such services. The intrusion detection system solution
can be employed to study the behavior of malware samples while accessing cloud services
and distinguish these behaviors from normal ones.
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